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Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum:
Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and Inclusion
NAN D. HUNTER*
In this article, Professor Hunter questions the naturalness and inevitability of the
dichotomy in constitutional law between freedom of expression and the right to
equality. She places the origin of this doctrinal divergence in the history of
American social protest movements in the first half ofthe twentieth century, which
began with ideologically-based claims and shifted to a primay emphasis on
identity-based equality claims. During the interim period between World War I and
World War I, the wave ofseminal FirstAmendment cases was ebbing and the wave
of equality claims was beginning to swell. Close examination of the constitutional
jurisprudence from that time reveals that the Court was groping toward the
principle of anti-orthodoxy in expression law and the principle of anti-exclusion in
equality law as mutually reinforcing concepts.
Professor Hunter proposes that constitutionaljurisprudence reclaim the twin
principles of anti-orthodoxy and inclusion. Using that lens, she re-examines the
Supreme Court's ruling in a "hate speech" prosecution and the more general
debate on issues of multiculturalism. She argues that a less dichotomized
perspective shifts the valence ofthe expression/equality dichotomy so as to enable
a richer understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of both of these
centrally important principles.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court ruled by one vote that a state could
criminalize speech that "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue
of a class of citizens... [or] exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion
to contempt, derision, or obloquy." I Such laws were advocated by equality
proponents of the day.2 Writing in dissent Justice Black warned minority groups
pleased by the ruling that it would boomerang, leaving them to contemplate the
wisdom of the saying that "another such victory and I am undone." 3
That was the beginning of the expression versus equality debate, and it shows no
signs of going away. Today it seems as though it will be with us always.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I wish to thank my colleagues for their generosity
of time and insights, and to acknowledge the financial support provided by the school's program
of summer research grants. Two law students-Thomas Wittig, Class of 2000, and Anthony
Brown, Class of 2003-contributed excellent assistance. As always, I thank Lisa Duggan for her
support, acumen, and patience.
1 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,251 (1952).
2 See generally David Riesman, Democracy andDefamation: The Control of Group Libel,
42 COLUM. L. R v. 727 (1942); Joseph Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNEL L. Q. 261 (1950).
3 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 275.
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Although the Court's ruling in Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled,
it is no longer relied on as good law. Thus, the predictive rule in this debate appears
easy: Beauharnais to the contrary notwithstanding, except on rare occasions,
expression trumps. But a remarkably thin layer of reasoning underlies this semi-
automatic result, and no coherent principle exists for explaining the exceptions. True,
constitutional law is filled with platitudes of First Amendment fundamentalism, but
most ofthose platitudes date from an era when equality was an underdeveloped realm
of constitutional law. They predate equality's claims to a central and, indeed,
fundamental role in a properly functioning democracy. Reviewing the vast literature
of this debate, one is struck by a sense that it sounds very much like the First
Amendment simply got there first.
This article questions the naturalness and inevitability of the doctrinal dichotomy
between expression and equality. I locate the history ofthis divergence in the history
of American social protest movements in the first half ofthe twentieth century, which
began with ideologically-based claims and shifted to a primary emphasis on identity-
based equality claims. I argue that the two strands have been far more imbricated than
the neat doctrinal categories would suggest, and that, in fact, current doctrine now
misrepresents the relationship between the two.
First Amendment jurisprudence has never fully comprehended the role that
group identity dynamics played in the seminal case law protecting speech, but has
rather treated those cases as emerging from disconnected, atomistic encounters
between a repressive state and dissenting individuals. Group identity was critical,
though, for two reasons: both because the speakers were targeted solely because of
their group affiliation (loners who professed the same radical viewpoints usually were
not targeted) and because identity characteristics such as ethnicity, religion and race
permeated the speech cases, even if not acknowledged by the courts.
Equality law also has contributed to the misrepresentation. There, the focus is
flipped, from the individual to characteristics of the group. Whereas in speech law we
believe that all speakers should be protected, in equality law, courts must select which
groups are entitled to heightened judicial review of laws that disadvantage them. This
selection process privileges status-and static-characteristics. Equality law protects
difference, not disagreement
In this article, I suggest a new approach that focuses on neither the doctrinal
categories nor the rhetoric associated with the expression versus equality debates, but
on the underlying interests served by both the free expression and equality mandates:
anti-orthodoxy and inclusion. If we begin our analysis there, the relationship between
the two principles realigns in many instances and the conceptualization of the
underlying tensions better serves the original goals of liberty and equality.
The article begins at the beginning of modem First Amendment law, with the
World War I Era "clear and present danger" cases, and works forward to current First
Amendment law, tracing the development of the dominance of individualist rationales
for protecting expression. In the second section of Part I, I begin with today's
1672 [Vol. 61:1671
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concepts of equality, centered on group characteristics, and work backward to an
analysis of how the framework of protected groups became frozen in the law.
In Part 1, I examine the point of convergence: a moment of overlap and hybridity
in the expression-equality dynamic that lasted from roughly the end of World War I
to the end of World War 11. This was the period during which the wave of seminal
First Amendment cases was ending and the wave of equality claims was beginning
to swell. My starting point is footnote four in the Carolene Products case,4 a footnote
that has been read for many purposes, but never for its insights into the interplay
between expression and equality. A close reading of its text against the social context
of its time yields a much richer understanding of how the Court was groping toward
the principle of anti-orthodoxy in expression law and the principle of anti-exclusion
in equality law as mutually reinforcing concepts.
In the next two parts, I set forth the current legacy of those beginnings. In Part III,
I examine the law of hate speech, the issue most frequently associated with the
expression/equality debate and one where the conventional understanding that
expression trumps equality is most fully developed. The central doctrinal text is
RA. V. v. City of St. Paul,5 in which the Court debated at great length the conflict
between the two principles. Upon a close reading, that text reveals deep fissures and
inconsistencies that the Court's reasoning fails to resolve or, in many instances, even
address.
In Part IV, I analyze contemporary expression/equality rhetoric in the political
discourse surrounding multiculturalism. The claims and critiques associated with
multiculturalism reveal not one debate, but a series of component questions that also
underlie the legal discourse surrounding the expression/equality dichotomy.
Analyzing the cluster of issues raised by debates over multiculturalism illuminates
many ofthe foundational contests that arise under the rubrics of both free expression
and equality.
Lastly, I outline an approach that puts the values of anti-orthodoxy and equality
at the center of the argument I do not suggest that all tension will simply evaporate
by this move. However, it does shill the valence of the debate and helps to reframe
this persistent constitutional paradox in a way that enables a richer understanding,
both historically and jurisprudentially.
4 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
5 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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I. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DICHOTOMY
A. Modem First Amendment Law
Let us consider that one explanation for the persistence and tenacity of this
dichotomy is simply that it is true. Perhaps there is an inherent irreducible conflict
between the value of free, independent thought and expression on the one hand, and
equality of persons and groups on the other. There unquestionably is a conflict
between them insofar as each "side" in the debate asserts a claim to the pinnacle of
normative value, claiming itself to be the magic key necessary to unlock the full
promise of constitutional democracy.
But that is not the only, nor, I argue, the most persuasive explanation for this
enduring opposition. A more nuanced explanation can be discerned from tracing the
history of how each doctrine functioned as oppositional discourse and how each
shaped and was shaped in turn by the meaning of the other. The resulting body of law
then flowed into larger cultural channels, which deepened some of its features while
depleting others.
During the first half of the twentieth century, First Amendment law was shaped
by the oppositional politics of radical leftist organizations which focused their
ideology on issues of economic class and the concept of class solidarity. What is
important to this article is not their political arguments per se, but the social context
surrounding their real and perceived solidarity. The individualist emphasis of the free
speech law that developed misunderstood and misrepresented what were powerful
aspects of equality and identity issues just beneath the surface. The dissident
organizations were united by strong cultural and often ethnic bonds, as well as by
ideology. This misunderstanding set the stage for the law's construction of expression
and equality as an exaggerated dichotomy.
1. Dissent and Social Practice
The seminal cases of modem First Amendmentjurisprudence arose when radical
leftists of various stripes called for, at least in some cases, the overthrow of the
government and its replacement by the unpropertied class. It was a war of ideas.
Indeed, one ofthe war's byproducts was Justice Holmes' famous migrating metaphor,
transferring "fighting faiths" to the marketplace.6 The marketplace and the workplace
were what the war was about.
6 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe... that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....
1674 [Vol. 61:1671
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This ideological challenge was not articulated in terms of any identity that we
think of today as implicated by equality law. Its hallmark was, to the Court, "a silly
leaflet by an unknown man."7 The bond asserted was that of economic class. The
proposition that economic class formed the sole bond that counted was an essential
part of the ideology.
Class solidarity was always, especially in the U.S., partial and provisional. The
radical organizer, the speaker in most of these cases, could never take for granted that
a worker with few assets and no wealth would identify with other workers. Unions
and leftist organizations were voluntarist to be joined upon persuasion. One might
be bom into poverty, but there was always the possibility-however dim in reality-
that the worker would attain Higher class status or, as a substitute, identify her own
interests in aspirational alignment with those of the owners of wealth and the means
of production. Because a few did succeed, all could-or so the argument went Class
solidarity commanded no automatic allegiance, only that which it could secure by
persuasion, by argument based on ideas, or by speech.
The seminal First Amendment cases on political speech crystallized in the era
during and immediately after World War I. Though the Court never framed them as
such, they arose from group activity and concerned speech about class solidarity.8
7 Id at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (Emma Goldman and Alexander
Berkman prosecuted under Selective Draft Law for conspiring to urge men not to register for the
draft); Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918) (prosecution under Selective Draft Law for
urging men not to register for the draft); Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918)
(prosecution under Selective Draft Law for inducing men not to register); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (prosecution under Espionage Act for distribution of Socialist Party
leaflets); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (prosecution under Espionage Act for speech
by Socialist Party leader that undermined recruiting efforts); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919) (prosecution under Espionage Act for distribution of leaflet arguing that the purpose
of the war was "to protect the loans of Wall Street'); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (prosecution under Espionage Act for distribution of "revolutionist," "anarchist" leaflets);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (prosecution under Espionage Act for publication
of anti-war opinions and articles in German-language newspapers); Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920) (prosecution under Espionage Act for distribution of Socialist Party leaflets);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (prosecution under Minnesota statute prohibiting
speaking against enlistment for anti-war speech by Nonpartisan League official); United States
ex reL Milwaukee Social Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) (prosecution
under Espionage Act for mailing of Socialist newspaper); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (prosecution under New York criminal anarchy statute for circulation of Socialist Party
papers); Bums v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927) (prosecution under California criminal
syndicalism act for advocacy of sabotage); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(prosecution under California criminal syndicalism act for participation in Communist Labor Party
meeting); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (prosecution under Califomia statute
prohibiting display of red flag).
2000] 1675
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Most were prosecutions under either the Espionage Act of 19179 or state laws against
syndicalism.10 They were directed at persons who opposed the war on leftist class-
based grounds, primarily members of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.
or Wobblies) or the Socialist Party."I
9 As enacted in 1917 and amended in 1918, the law prohibited making "false reports or false
statements with intent to interfere" with the armed forces or to promote enemy forces; willfully
causing or attempting to cause "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty"; obstructing
or attempting or conspiring to obstruct recruiting or enlistment Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3,
40 Stat 217,219, (incorporated in 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1994)). These provisions formed the basis
for most of the major prosecutions except for Abrams, which invoked sections of the 1918
amendment that criminalized "disloyal, profane scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States"; "language intended to bring the form of government... into
contempt, scom, contumely, or disrepute"; "language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage
resistance" to the war effort; and advocacy of curtailing production of material needed for the war
effort. Act ofMay 16, 1918, ch. 75 § 3, 40 Stat 553, repealed by Act ofMarch 3, 1921, ch. 136,
41 Stat 1360.
10 Syndicalism laws were enacted by twenty-one states and two territories. ELDRIDGE F.
DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDIcALisM LEGISLATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 21, 147
(1939). Additional states enacted laws against anarchy or sedition, also used against the same
radical groups. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 187-93, 399-405 (1920).
Syndicat is the French word for trade union. Syndicalism began as a militant trade union
movement in France in the 1890s. Its hallmark was its rejection of Marxist methods simultaneously
with its adoption of fundamental Marxist principles such as class struggle and a goal of proletarian
control. Syndicalists eschewed political organizing directed at agencies of the state in favor of
direct action, including strikes, in and about the workplace. One strain of the movement was
anarcho-syndicalism, characterized by advocacy of the abolition of the state and its replacement
byvoluntary associations. THE HARPER DICONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 23,619 (Alan Bullock
& Oliver Stallybrass eds., 1977).
11 See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTES IN THE
UNrrED STATES 95-96, 104-05, 226-38 (1979); ROBERT JUsTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLmcAL
REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 116-28 (1978); MELVYN
DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 376-82
(1969); PHILP S. FONER, 4 HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNTIED STATES 557 (1947)
[hereinafter FONER, HISTORY]; WILUAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENs AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL
SUPPRESSION OF RADIcAis: 1903-1933, at 99-103, 182-87 (1963); Vincent Blasi, The First
Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion, in Whitney v. California, 29
WM. & MARYL. REV. 653, 654-56 (1988).
The annual reports of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) document how specific
the targets of the prosecutions were. "There are 53 prisoners in the federal penitentiaries still
serving sentences under the Espionage Act for expressions of opinion .... All but four of the
prisoners are members ofthe I.W.W. .. . American Civil Liberties Union, WorkAhead (Februry
1923), 1921-22 ANNUAL REPORTS 33. "There are 58 prisoners under criminal syndicalism or
sedition laws, in the following states: California, 29 I.W.W.'s and 3 members of the Communist
Labor Party; Washington, 18 (all I.W.W.'s); Idaho, 3 (all I.W.W.'s); Pennsylvania, 4
(communists); and Kansas, 1 (I.W.W.)."Id at 34. "Arrests of I.W.W.'s have continued throughout
the year." ACLU, Free Speech in 1924, 1925 ANNUAL REPORTS 19.
1676 [V ol. 61:1671
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Protests of the war by Wobblies and Socialists grew directly out of a political
belief that workers should fight only for redistribution of wealth, and that the war
served only the interests of capitalists.12 The union's tenets formed in reaction to
capitalist business interests. These leftists saw govemment policy as largely
epiphenomenal. They believed the state to be little more than a front for capitalist
interests.13
The government's reaction to the Wobblies was extreme. Business interests,
especially in the western states where Wobblies concentrated their efforts, lobbied
Congress and federal officials to crack down on the union's militant and disruptive
organizing tactics, and they did. At the state level, virtually all ofthe syndicalism laws
were enacted between 1917 and 1920, in an open effort to suppress the Wobblies.14
Such statutes prohibited the advocacy of syndicalism, which the statutes defined as
a doctrine "which advocates crime, violence, sabotage or other unlawful acts as a
means of... reform." 15 Unlike the Socialists, who eschewed violence, the Wobblies,
as self-proclaimed syndicalists, advocated sabotage in varying degrees.' 6 For both the
Wobblies and the Socialists, their pre-war radicalism led them to oppose the war, and
their opposition to the war provided an excuse for federal action to eradicate the threat
they posed to industrial peace.17
Whatever their impact on labor law, it is to the Wobblies that we owe the concept
of using claims to free speech as something more than byproducts of a protest
movement Wobblies were the first to engage in political actions labeled specifically
12 DAiD MONTGOMmEY, THE FAL OF THE HousE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE,
AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM 1865-1925, at 371-72 (1987); FONER, HISTORY supra note 11,
at 554-57; DUBOF5KY, supra note 11, at 350-58.
13 DoxVu, supra note 10, at 26-29. This analysis extended to the courts, which Wobblies
viewed as merely a "mirror" reflecting the interests of those who owned the means of production.
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEEcH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 86 (1997) (quoting Why Free Speech
is Denied the LWW.., INDUS. WOPKE, Nov. 17, 1909, at 4).
14 DOwVa, supra note 10, at 21, 45-50; MURPHY, supra note 11, at 86-87; PRESrON, supra
note 11, at 99-103; GOLDSTN, supra note 11, at 115-16. In California, one municipality made
it a crime to belong to the I.W.W. That ordinance was stricken in Ex Parte Campbell, 221 P. 952
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923). However, mere membership was a sufficient basis upon which to
convict for criminal syndicalism. People v. McClennegen, 234 P. 91, 101 (Cal. 1925). Membership
also sufficed to support a conviction for criminal anarchy in Washington. State v. Lowery, 177 P.
355 (Wash. 1918).
15 DOWEL, supra note 10, at 17.
16 See Bums v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927) (upholding conviction for advocacy of
sabotage). Syndicalists called for direct action by workers. Depending on the speaker, "direct
action" could mean strikes, peaceful workplace resistance, sabotage or acts of violence. FONEP,
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 13-22, 160-71.
17 DUBOFSKY, supra note 11, at 378-82.
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as "free speech fights."1 8 In city after city, the Wobblies' organizers initiated "direct
action" campaigns that began with setting up a makeshift platform, often a soapbox,
and entreating listeners to join or contribute funds to the I.W.W. When the first wave
of speakers were imprisoned, dozens or hundreds more Wobblies would arrive and
go through the same process of speaking and being carried off to jail. 19 The arrests
created political prisoners and reframed the local dispute, often publicized nationally,
to focus on free speech.
Wobblies were divided among themselves over whether these fights were worth
the resources devoted to them or were simply distractions from the central aim of
organizing the workplace. Nonetheless, they initiated the use of First Amendment
claims as a deliberate strategy. Ironically, given the courts' invocation of the soapbox
as a symbol for the speech of the individual iconoclast for decades after,20 many of
the earliest soapbox speakers were anything but loners-they were teams of
Wobblies.21
18 The facts in this and the following paragraph are based on RABBAN, supra note 13, at 78-
128; FONER, HISTORY, supra note 11, at 172-213; DusoFsKY, supra note 11, at 173-97. See also
Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making ofAmerica's "First Freedom," 1909-
1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557, 566-72 (1999); Philip S. Foner, Introductio, in FELLOW
WORKERS AND FRIENDS: I.W.W. FREE SPEECH FIGHTS As TOLD BY PARTICIPANTs 3-22 (Philip S.
Foner, ed., 1981) [hereinafter Foner, Introduction].
19 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, an I.W.W. organizer who was one ofthe originators of free speech
fights during a strike in Montana in 1908, called them "performances" in a speech reflecting on
her career.
There were many free speech fights.... [T]hey would send out telegrams something like this,
and say: "Foot Loose Wobblies, come at once, defend the Bill of Rights," and they would
come... by the hundreds literally they would land in these communities,.. . and they would stand
up on platforms or soap box and they would read part of the Constitution of the United States or
the Bill ofRights.... [Tihese performances were repeated innumerable times.
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Memories of the Industrial Workers of the World, Address at Northern
Illinois University (Nov. 8, 1962), at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/ 5202/rebelgirl.html
(on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). See also EU1ZABErH GtRLEYFLYNN, THE REBEL GIRL:
AN AuroBIOGRAPHY 103-08, 170-73, 177-79 (1973 ed.).
20 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ('Through the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer.")
21 The I.W.W. began in 1905. FONER, HISTORY, supra note 11, at 15. The earliest noted
published use of"soap box" with apolitical connotaticn was in Jack London's memoir, THE ROAD
211 (1907) ("I get up on a soap-box to trot out the particular economic bees that buzz in my
bonnet."); J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, XV THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 897 (1989).
London's memoir does not mention the I.W.W. specifically, but many of the experiences that he
describes were in the company of transient workers in the West who comprised much of the
I.W.W.'s membership. Philip Foner credits Socialists in Seattle with first challenging bans on
1678 [Vol. 61:1671
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The zeal that enabled the Wobblies to mobilize scores of transient workers into
organizational activists created a social identity, as well as an ideology. Wobblies
were often compared, by themselves and others, to a religion.22 One historian of
religion has argued that the comparison is more than metaphorical or dismissive: the
Wobblies' critique of capitalism drew directly on the Social Gospel movement, then
a widespread form of populist Christianity. 23 Moreover, their organizing methods
suggested religiosity as well: the Wobblies' extensive use of music to inspire their
followers imitated the hymn-singing at rural camp meetings and revivals, no doubt
triggering those associations among listeners.24 Nor was the music treated as trivial
by the courts. Some of the songs were used agains them, read into evidence by the
prosecution.2 5
It was that extraordinary collectivity that led to their repression. The defendants
in the major wartime cases were essentially prosecuted as representatives of the
Wobblies or the Socialist Party, not as lonely voices on soapboxes.26 Their opposition
to the war came from a specific ideological location, which in turn grew out of the
strength of a collective identification based on class. The sense that they posed a
significant threat came from the fact that they represented not isolated individuals, but
an organized constituency with a shared creed. They not only engaged in mere acts
of conscience, but they also called for one great industrial union.27 Radical leftists
were not the only persons who experienced the repression of that era, but they bore
the brunt of it More conventional trade unionists supported the war,28 and more
speakers by filling local jails with soapbox orators, but that tactic soon became associated primarily
with the Wobblies. Foner, Introduction, supra note 18, at 13-14.
2 2 DONALD E. WINTERS, JR., THE SOUL OF THE WOBBLIES: THE I.W.W., RELIGION AND
AMERicAN CuLTuRE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1905-1917, at3, 7-9,61-63 (1985).
23Id at 15.
24 Id at 37-38. A character in a World War I-era novel described the Wobblies: "They called
themselves materialist-economists, but what they really were was a religion.... mhey were
welded together by a vision we don't possess.... And sing! [Y]ou never heard anybody sing the
way those guys sang! Nobody sings like they did unless its for a religion." JAMES JONEs, FROM
HERE TO ETERNrry 640 (1951); See also DuBoPSY, supra note 11, at x. To that end, the I.W.W.
published a "Little Red Song Book." RABBAN, supra note 13, at 79.
25 WNrERS, supra note 22, at 42; Blasi, supra note 11, at 659.
26 Charles Evans Hughes, in the interval between his periods of service as a Supreme Court
Justice, noted that the New York legislature's refusal to seat five elected members because they
were Socialists revealed the centrality of the group identification: 'I understand that the action is
not directed against these five elected members as individuals but that the proceeding is virtually
an attempt to indict a political party." Hughes Upholds Socialists' Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10,
1920, at I (reprinting Letter from Charles E. Hughes to Thaddeus C. Sweet, Speaker of the New
York Assembly, (Jan. 9, 1920)), quoted in ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THRTY-FivE YEARs wrrH
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 10 (1952).
27 FONER, supra note 11, at 167.
28 MONTGOMERY, supra note 12, at 375 (indicating that the AFL supported the war).
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traditional pacifists and non-party-aligned leftists, though prosecuted, were better able
to mobilize support to curtail or end their harassment.2 9 Although other anti-war or
pro-German sympathizers were also prosecuted, the cases from which the "clear and
present danger" debates in First Amendment law sprang involved union or party
members.
After the Wobblies' destruction and the Socialist Party's decline after the war,
subsequent prosecutions under state criminal syndicalism or anarchy statutes targeted
members of the then-new Communist Party or organizers from what remained of the
left-wing of the labor movement.30 By the time the McCarthy Era began,
prosecutions under the Smith Act focused on the Communist Party as such.31 But the
belief that the early "clear and present danger" cases grew from the individual radical
on a soapbox, and that the targeting of organizations began later with the Communist
Party, is false.32 The group affiliation of the targets was the driving force behind who
was prosecuted for political speech from the beginning of modem speech law.
Although not acknowledged, cross-cutting vectors of identity also lay beneath the
surface of these cases. Hostility against immigrants was intense, and anti-Semitism
and bias against Catholics festered in the background of many battles about economic
class.33 Underlying the reaction against much of the leftist organizing was repugnance
at the predominantly non-Anglo backgrounds of the leaders.34
29 MURPHY, supra note 11, at 57-65,99-101.
30 ACLU, The Story of the Activities of the American Civil Liberties Union 1928-1929,
1928-29 ANNUAL REPORTS 4:
The record for 1928 shows more meetings broken up by the police, more arrests under local laws
in free speech cases, more injunctions than in any year since 1921. The causes were primarily the
campaign activities of the Communist Party and its related organizations, and the left-wing strikes
in the coal and textile industries.
31 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
32 Emerson's work, for example, concentrates on the doctrinal development of which test is
used to assess when government may proscribe an individual's expression of political belief.
Group identity as such figured prominently in his analysis only in the McCarthy Era. THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESsION 129-41 (1970). Harry Kalven, on the other
hand, recognized the importance of the group context for the seminal First Amendment cases. See
HARRY KALvEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADmoN: FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven, ed.) 121,
133-34, 191-92 (1988). He also recognized, however, that in the Court's opinions, the shift from
an individual speaker to a group affiliation focus began with the Smith Act prosecutions. Id at 192.
33 William Nelson has suggested that our understanding ofthejudicial response to that social
movement should be broadened to include not only the speech cases, but also cases establishing
the rights of religious minorities. William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in
Twentieth-Centwy ConstitutionalLaw, 52 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 3, 13 (1995).
34 MONirOMERY, supra note 12, at 461-64. Anti-radical trade unionists during World War
I launched a campaign "to Americanize the labor movement in greater New York."
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These biases are also evident from the flavor of the text in judicial decisions.35
Often immigrant status and ethnicity or religion melded in the public's mind and in
judicial proceedings. In one prosecution in federal court in Indiana, the judge
remarked:
I think that about the least commendable sort of folks I know are these
Russians .... Why? Because we do not give them everything they want. [A public
speaker] was here not long ago and delivered an address, but she didn't simply want the
Jews to have their rights. The trouble with [the speaker] is that she wanted the Jews to
have everything that we have got; and that is the way with [the defendant]. 36
The conflation of ethnicity with viewpoint flavored two of the keystone decisions
of the era. In New York v. Gitlow, the Appellate Division opined that "[w]e find these
doctrines (of proletarian dictatorship) principally advocated by those who come from
Russia and bordering countries and their descendants, as is the appellant" 37 The New
York Court of Appeals noted that "it doubtless would be something of a shock to
citizens of this state to be told that persons bom in other countries and saturated with
anarchistic and revolutionary notions might come into this state and advocate the
overthrow by force of our present government without being liable." 38 Gitlow's co-
defendant at trial, James Larkin, was repeatedly referred to by the New York Times
as "the Irish agitator." 39
Similarly in Abrams v. United States,40 the identity of a Russian Jew and the
belief in leftist philosophy were treated as one. After twice asking Abrams on the
stand, "Why don't you go back to Russia?," Federal District Court Judge Henry
Clayton commented that, "I wish these people were over there now.'41 At sentencing
he stated that Jews, especially, understood the benefits of capitalism. "Talk about your
old Jerusalem! I don't blame our good, free American Jewish citizens for not wanting
to go back to Jerusalem. They have got a better thing in old New York."42 All the
evidence, in his view, proved conclusively that "you never can get the American idea
35 Id at 376.
36 CHAFEE, supra note 10, at 82-83 (quoting the unreported 1918 case of United States v.
Zimmerman).
37 New Yorkv. Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. 783,791 (App. Div. 1921). Gitlowhimselfwas born in
New Jersey, of immigrant parents.
38 New York v. Gitlow, 136 N.E. 317,325 (N.Y. 1922).
39 See, e.g., Prosecutor Calls Gitlow Communist, N.Y. TIm s, Jan. 31, 1920, at 2; Gitlow and
Larkin Must Serve Terms, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1922, at 14.
40 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
41 RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
FREE SPEECH 121 (1987).
42 Id at 143.
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into the head of an anarchist."43 In the Supreme Court's opinion in the case, the
description of the defendants' activities contains pointed references to the fact that the
radical literature that served as the basis for the charges was published in Yiddish. 4
Thus, although the formal doctrinal debates about early First Amendment law
made no mention of prejudice or equality concerns and focused solely on the degree
of danger posed by anti-capitalist philosophy, the inflections of identity were there
from the beginning.
2. The Trope ofIndividualism
Prior to World War I, very little First Amendment law existed, and the pre-war
scholarship did not influence doctrine until after the war.45 Since then, in the
extensive scholarship debating the relative importance of which of the First
Amendment's civic functions best justify its primacy, the shared point of departure
has been the role of individualism.46 The context for nearly all these cases was a
criminal prosecution of specific persons. Often, however, they were prosecuted in
groups. The doctrine, then in its infancy, could have been grounded more in
associational rights, as a branch of it later was. 4 7 Instead, four strands converged in
these cases to produce the individualist conceptualization of speech rights.48
The first was the radical libertarianism of those being prosecuted, especially the
Wobblies. Central to the Wobblies' revolutionary syndicalism was a rejection of the
state and focus on the workplace. Indeed, the Socialist Party attacked the Wobblies
43 Id at 142.
44 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617.
45 RABBAN, supra note 13, at 210; MURPHY, supra note 11, at 17-20.
46 Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity and the Foundational Paradigms of
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103 (1992). 'The striking fact that emerges is that, no matter
what rationale is offered for free expression, the ultimate root of the guarantee can be traced to
deeply individualistic premises." Id at 135. Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law:
Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 320-21 (1988)
("ITihe values and assumptions of individualism... unquestionably [have] become the great
tradition of first amendment thought."); STEVEN H. SHFFRn, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 (1990) ("The First Amendment's purpose and function in the
American polity is not merely to protect negative liberty, but also affirmatively to sponsor the
individualism ... within us all.").
47 See infra Part I.C.
4 8 A more broadly focused intellectual history of this period attributes the dominance of
individualism to "the emergence of... modernist consciousness." G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth Century America, 95
MICH. L. REv. 299, 301 (1996) [hereinafter White, The First Amendment Comes of Age].
Modernist legal writers "took humans to be free in the deepest sense: free to master and to control
their own destinies." Id at 304.
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for exhorting workers to ignore politics.49 Vis-a-vis the state, the Wobblies called for
individual liberty. In this they were joined by the other significant free speech
movement prior to World War I, the "free love" and early birth control advocates,
who faced prosecution under the Comstock Act.50 Their own rhetoric in relation to
the state celebrated a very personal notion of freedom and a deep hostility to any
limitations on speech.
The second strand was composed of believers in a traditional liberty of contract
individualism. "Conservative libertarians" believed that the liberties of contract and
speech were linked; unlike leftists such as the Wobblies, they believed that private
property was essential to individual freedom. 51 Justice Holmes embodied this
philosophy. Initially, jurists such as Holmes accepted that the state had the power as
a property owner to control speech on public property52 and could properly punish
speech with "bad tendencies." 53 Holmes' view on this question shifted dramatically
at the very end of the war, as was reflected in the difference between his position as
the author of Schenk and a dissenter in Abrams. Holmes came to believe that such
usages of state power amounted to authoritarianism, against which individual freedom
of conscience provided the best defense.54 Throughout his career, however,
individualism (in a matrix with market and property) served as the framing paradigm.
The third base for the individualism, so completely incorporated in this critical
moment into First Amendmentjurisprudence, was exemplified by the philosophy of
Justice Brandeis. Brandeis shared the views of his contemporaries in the progressive
movement, who moved away from traditional concepts of individualism to an
49 DoWELL, supra note 10, at 26 n.17.
50 Act of March 3, 1973, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1462
(1994)); RABBAN, supra note 13, at 75-76,213. Among those persons was Emma Goldman, who
defended "an unlimited exercise of expression," and Roger Baldwin, founder of the American
Civil Liberties Union, who was deeply influenced by Goldman. MARK A. GRABE.,
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 53-54 (1991).
51 GRABER, supra note 50, at 21.
52 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895) (written by Justice Holmes while he was
on the Supreme Court ofMassachusetts), afl'a Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The
Court repudiated this analysis in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). For a re-reading of Davis
arguing that Holmes' view was analogous to a legitimate time, place, and manner restriction when
understood in light of the late nineteenth-century design of public parks as pastoral enclaves, see
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View ofthe Counter Majoritarian Difficult, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1881, 1895-1900 (1991).
53 In Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), for example, Justice Holmes wrote the
opinion of the Court upholding a statute that criminalized the advocacy of nudism.
54 RABBAN, supra note 13, at 343, 349-55; G. EDWARD WHrrF, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMEs: LAW AND THE ]NNER SELF 412-54 (1993); White, The First Amendment Comes ofAge,
supra note 48, at 318-23; Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-
1928, 40 MD. L. RPv. 349,372-74 (1981).
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emphasis on the interdependent, interactive nature of social rights.55 Brandeis saw
speech primarily as a right "essential" to the functioning of "effective democracy.' 6
He saw freedom of speech as a shared positive good, necessary to the proper
development of a citizen. He invoked the Founders, who "valued liberty both as an
end and as a means."'57 Despite his different focus, however, Brandeis framed speech
rights in language as individualist as Holmes's.
Lastly, the link that previous scholars have not recognized is that the politics of
interpretive enterprise itself locked in the individualist focus. Each of these cases
concerned the proper relationship between the speaker's true intent and the
predictable reaction of the audience. The jurists uniformly assumed a chain leading
from the speaker's thoughts to his words to the audience's comprehension to their
acts in response. The major debate arose over where to draw the line of illegality,
whether at the speaker's words or the audience's reaction. Under the old approach,
the line was drawn in the audience: if they reasonably could be expected to act on the
exhortations, the speaker was liable.58
The victory for free speech lay in jettisoning the "bad tendencies" focus initially
favored by Holmes and the majority of the Court and adopting a test centered on
whether the words themselves constituted direct incitement 59 Thus, in substantial
55 RABBAN, supra note 13, at 17-18; GRABER, supra note 44, at 75-83, 87-104, 115-21;
White, The First Amendment Comes ofAge, supra note 42, at 323-27; Cover, supra note 54, at
373-87; PninaLahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free
Speech, 4 J.L. & PoL. 451, 458-66 (1988); Bobertz, supra, note 18, at 634-40. Chafee also
invoked both individualist and social rationales for protecting speech. CHAFEE, supra note 10, at
36. His primary achievement, however, was his radical reinterpretation of Holmes, appropriating
the legendary figure of Holmes to serve as the fountainhead for a progressive civil libertarian
concept of speech, despite Holmes' continued allegiance to more conservative principles
associated with the freedom to contract. GRABE, supra note 50 at 1-7, 122-51; RABBAN, supra
note 13, at 353-54.
56 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
57 Id at 375 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
58 For example, Justice Holmes wrote in Debs that the law properly allowed the jury to
determine that "one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not matter, was to
oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its
natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting... [and] that would be its probable
effect." Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214-15 (1919).
59 "Advocacy of law breaking' that "falls short of incitement' could be punished only upon
a showing that "the advocacy would be immediately acted on" with "the probability of serious
injury." Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376-78. Justice Holmes also acknowledged, however, that the law
of criminal attempt provided the source for his clear and present danger test. GRABER, supra note
50, at 110-11.
The new test became settled law in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). "Under
Brandenburg, probability of harm is no longer the central criterion for speech limitations. The
inciting language of the speaker-[Judge Learned] Hand['s] focus on 'objective' words-is the
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measure, the liberty-enhancing intervention was to de-contextualize, to ignore the
audience's reaction or likely reaction, and to focus solely on the words of the
individual speaker. By this strategy, liberals sought to remove the guilt by ignoring
the association.
The new test also turned the speaker into a cipher. Her race, ethnicity, and social
identity had never been acknowledged as part of any constitutional standard, although
those factors weighed heavily in the cases. Now they became even less likely to
surface in judicial texts, since the analysis focused narrowly on the words spoken or
published, largely without regard to who the speaker or audience was.
The eventual triumph of free speech, by the establishment of tight limits on the
state's power to silence radicals, marked not only a recognition of a citizen's moral
autonomy and integrity, but also a willingness to take the risk of allowing space for
sharply competing ideologies. The rhetorical vindication of free speech may have
rung most loudly when associated with a likelihood that the defenders of the state
would win the persuasion game. As Bradley Bobertz noted, "Tolerance of speech was
made easier once it was clear that the words would lead nowhere."60 Central to its
normative hold, however, was acceptance of the possibility that anyone could
ultimately persuade a majority that minds do change. 61 The moral luster associated
with the First Amendment flows from its willingness to take that risk.
The possibility of class mobility and the risk of ideological mobility grounded the
right to expression and dissent. Mobility was in trm associated with individualism.
It is, after all, individual minds that change. Moreover, at least occasionally, they
could change in either direction. Leftists may have castigated the figure of Horatio
Alger as a traitor to his class, but Wall Street hated Franklin Roosevelt for the same
reason. Individualism of belief became the ultimate marker of freedom, especially, if
major consideration.' Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719,755 (1975).
60 Bobertz, supra note 18, at 621.
61 Justice Holmes's rhetoric is especially stirring because of its invocation of this theme. In
his first break with the "bad tendencies" test, inAbrams, he concluded the paragraph containing
his famous statement about "the best test of truth" being in the marketplace as follows: "That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment Every year
if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
Gitlow, he returned to the same point. "Every idea is an incitement ... If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas had no better luck in arguing a variation on the same theme, that unpopular
speakers pose no real threat. American Communists, he wrote, "are miserable merchants of
unwanted ideas.... [They are] the best known, the most beset, and the least thriving of any fifth
column in history. Only those beset by fear and panic could think otherwise." Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Holmes's and Douglas's dissents, in
modified form, ultimately became law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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not only, in First Amendment jurisprudence. Individualism supplied the cultural
meaning of the First Amendment and became indelibly associated with the nation's
keystone freedom.
The dominant trope of individualism in First Amendment law succeeded in
thoroughly de-socializing dissent, despite the fact that the definitive law of dissent
emerged from a line of cases involving organized, thoroughly socialized expression.
Individualism retained the mobility and fluidity implicit in concepts of dissent, but
drained dissent of its interactive, social character. The framing of the right as so
deeply individualist appropriated conservative rhetoric, and was an extremely
effective political strategy. Its long-term effect, however, was to conservatize the
speech doctrine even as it sheltered the society's most radical critics. In a parallel
paradox, the more conservative trade unionists who adopted an interest group benefits
approach devoid of a "bigger" ideological framework produced the highly regulatory
body of labor law with its statutory management of the workplace.
Like the soapbox, the First Amendment became an icon of individualism as
much in spite of, as because of, its history. The cultural meaning of the First
Amendment, so suffused with celebrations of the individual, is starkly different from
the social practices--the "'ree speech fights" led by leftist unions and political parties
that advocated working class solidarity-that in fact generated its modem viability.
Yet both those meanings of expressive freedom remain possible. K as Steven Shiffiin
writes, "America... regards the first amendment as an important symbol of what the
country means,"162 it is also true that it is a highly labile symbol.
B. Equality and Identity
In contrast to the sharp individualism that permeates the law of speech, the
concept of discrimination in contemporary Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence
turns on the description and evaluation of characteristics of particular groups.
Although the right to equal treatment belongs to the individual, the courts ascertain
to what extent that right will be protected in a series of inquiries related to the groups
to which one belongs. If there is a reasonably plausible state interest which could be
served by using a challenged classification, the Court will uphold it under a rational
basis test.6 3 The exception to this deference arises for classifications that trigger
heightened scrutiny; and to be accorded heightened scrutiny, the Court examines
characteristics of the group.
The obvious threshold prerequisite is that the characteristic be unrelated to the
qualifications relevant to the specific benefit or project at issue. Two related factors
upon which the Court has settled are a history of prejudice and discrimination against
62 SHfFRiN, supra note 46, at 5.
63 See, e.g., Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,318-21 (1993).
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the group and a resulting lack of political power in pluralist legislative bargaining.64
A third factor that has appeared and disappeared in the Court's various formulations
of a test for strict scrutiny is whether the characteristic that defines the group is
immutable.65 Immutability is the "it's not her fault" principle: an individual should
not be punished for a characteristic that she cannot control.66 "[L]egal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility."6 7 Immutability in turn is used as
a proxy for the two different subsidiary questions of whether the individual had
control over the acquisition of the characteristic and whether the individual can
control the manifestation of the characteristic. 68 Under either of those meanings,
however, requiring immutability purges the group of any ideological component to
its defining characteristic, since ideas are under the individual's control, both in their
acquisition and expression.
The Court has never specifically stated that immutability is a prerequisite for
heightened scrutiny,69 and scholars have extensively analyzed the illogic of requiring
it70 Despite the chorus of criticism, however, lower courts continue to rely on it.71
64 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631,645-48 (2000); City of Clebume, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442-44 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216-17 n.14
(1982); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359-61 (1978).
65 The Court first relied on immutability in Weber v. Aetna Casualy & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175-76(1972).
66 Thus it is no accident that the Court relied most heavily on immutability in cases involving
children, such as Weber, 406 U.S. 164, a case involving denial of benefits to children bom out of
wedlock, finding such discrimination unlawful largely on the ground that the children had no
control over their status as "illegitimate," id at 175-76, and Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, where the Court
refused to allow Texas to exclude children of illegal aliens from the public schools, reasoning that
the children had no control over the illegal acts of their parents,
67 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175, quotedin Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973). See
also Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MAN L. REV. 107,
148 (1990) ("Intuitively, all other things being equal, a person who is harmed because of an
immutable trait deserves more moral and legal concern than one harmed because of a mutable
trait.").
68 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisiteag 57
U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 276-82 (1996). For a discussion of immutability as a valid social, but not
biological factor, see Donald Braman, Of Race andImmutability, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1375 (1999).
69 Notably, there was no mention of immutability in the Court's most recent summary of
factors triggering the highest level of review. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. 631. However, the Court
continues to stress the relevance of a group being a "discrete and insular minority." Id at 645.
7 0 See generally Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don'tAsk Don't Tell," 108 YALEL.J. 485 (1998); Kenji Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols: The Literay Argument for Heightened Scrutinyfor Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
1753 (1996) [hereinafter, Yoshino, Suspect Symbols]; Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the
Politics ofBiology: A Critique oftheArgumentfirom Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994);
J. M. Balkin, The Constittion ofStatus, 106 YALE LJ. 2313 (1997); Karen Engle, The Persistence
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Moreover, some lower courts have gone so far as to import an immutability
requirement in interpreting civil rights statutes, ruling that discriminatory policies are
allowable if they burden changeable characteristics (hair length or the ability to speak
English, for example). 72 As a result the specter of an immutability requirement
hovers over a broad swath of equality law.
In my view, immutability continues its chimerical existence despite its illogic
because it serves a vital, if unacknowledged, function. It de-fangs the animus that
produces various forms of discrimination by positing that animus as the product of
irrational or mean-spirited prejudice, rather than as a full-blown ideology of
dominance.73 It locks in a status-based view of equal protection by assuring the
stability of the category and thus the reliability of the hierarchy that it grounds. To
describe a group as "different immutably so," 74 is to assure that this group's
boundaries are knowable, predictable, and unchanging.
There are essentially two functions of equal protection law. One is to protect the
individual who shares the characteristics of a group that is falsely maligned. An
example would be the exclusion of women from the practice of law on the ground
that nature disqualifies females for such an occupation. The second function is to
protect the individual who does not share the characteristics of a group about which
certain norms may be empirically accurate. An example would be the exclusion of all
women from heavy physical labor occupations requiring greater upper body strength
than most women have. The first is a problem of inaccuracy and the second, of false
generalization.
Both depend on the stability of the group's membership. If the target group is
viewpoint-defined rather than "naturally" defined-for example-if the target group
ofNeutrality: The Failure ofthe Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VI, 76 Thx
L. REV. 317 (1997); Feldblum, supra note 68.
71 "[W]hen addressing a characteristic, such as age, that is not the kind of immutable
characteristic as race, gender, or national origin, it is questionable that Congress could lawfully be
acting to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F3d 1426, 1430
n.8 (11th Cir. 1998), reh'gdeniea 157 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 1998), afl'don other grounds, 120
S.Ct. 631 (2000). The Third Circuit based its holding that mental retardation qualifies as the
predicate for a class-based animus, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), on the fact that retardation
is immutable. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682,687-88 (3d Cir. 1997).
72 See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of
Discrimination Under Title V1, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769 (1987). Since the Bayer article, courts
have continued to require immutability in Title VII cases. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139
F.3d 1385 (1lth Cir. 1998) (hair length). See also DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 314 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("If America stands for anything in the world, it is fairness to all, without regard to race,
sex, ethnicity, age, or other immutable characteristics that a person does not choose and cannot
change.").
73 Neil Gotanda echoes this point when he argues that treating race as immutable
"contribute[s] to a societal view of race as a neutral, objective and apolitical characteristic.' A
Critique of 'Our Constitution is Color-Blinj'44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1991).
74 City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985).
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is feminists rather than women, multiple problems ensue. Individual group members
may not even be women. Moreover, they can and do move in and out of the group,
meaning that they do bear individual responsibility for the targeted characteristic.
They can disassociate themselves from either an inaccurate assumption about the
group or an accurate generalization that does not describe them simply by exit
Both the agents of the state who classify and the challengers of those
classifications depend upon the clarity and stability of definitional lines, and thus
depend on reliable, fixed identities. Every equal protection challenge, the successful
as well as the unsuccessful, reinscribes those classifications ever more deeply into the
law.
There is a doubly paradoxical aspect to the enterprise. As Dan Danielsen and
Karen Engle noted, law has "sought both to recognize identity groups and to make
them irrelevant" 75 The additional paradox is that in both moves-recognition and
renunciation-the law strengthens the social power of the identity in question,
simultaneously constituting and containing the class. Law "reinvest[s] these
categories with meaning," thus further instantiating the social formations that we call
identity.76 Judicial reliance on immutability perpetuates that process by allowing for
judicial review to compensate for prejudice against only the most fixed of stigmatized
markers.77
Implicitly, the converse proposition is also true. The immutability criterion
facilitates policies targeted against the disempowered group that is united by belief.
In his influential analysis, John Hart Ely described the precondition of immutability
as not entirely irrelevant because it is aimed at discouraging people from joining a
group and encouraging them to exit 78 On this theory, using state power to discourage
certain self-chosen identifications is permitted.
75 DAN DANIELSEN & KAREN ENGLE, AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW & CULTURE xiv
(1995).
7 6 MARTHA MiNow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTrTY, PoLrmcs AND THE LAw 83 (1997).
See also Balkin, supra note 70, at 2366-67.
7 7 Scholars have debated whether the immutability factor protects against empathy failure.
The principle of empathy failure is that a legislator will be less likely to impose burdens on a group
defined by a characteristic that she has or could share-the "there but for the grace of God" point
If she feels comfortably positioned as others to the characteristic, and sure that she will never share
it, she is less likely to tread softly in imposing burdens on those perpetual "others" who do. That
situation justifies heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications. JOHN HART ELY,
DEmOCRACYAND DISrRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVImv 160-61 (1980).
On the other hand, mutable characteristics do not always elicit empathy. Like universal
characteristics, mutable traits, in theory, could be associated with anyone. Some mutable traits,
however, are so repugnant that their very mutability engenders heightened antipathy. Homosexual
orientation and lower economic class are two examples. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 70,
at 1823-24; Halley, supra note 70, at 517-21.
78 ELY, supra note 77, at 154-55.
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Equality advocates have responded, in part, by shifting the cultural meaning of
particular group memberships. The southern civil rights movement presented a
radical ideological challenge to southern apartheid, as well as an equality/identity
claim. Southern legal resistance initially used many of the same statutes and kinds of
statutes-loyalty oaths,79 registration of political groups, 80 and authorization of
legislative investigatory committees8l-as were used during the McCarthy Era.82 To
some extent, the failure of southern White resistance can be attributed to the civil
rights movement's victory in framing the issue as equality rather than left-wing
ideology, even though a huge block of the case law produced by the movement was
a continuation of First Amendment, rather than equality, jurisprudence. 83
As a contemporary example, it is no wonder that many lesbian and gay rights
advocates seized on scientific studies of genetics or hormones as a partial cause of
homosexuality. 84 Such a move is an effort to shift the cultural meaning of
"homosexuals" from one of persons characterized by volitional choices to one of
persons with biologically determined affinities that the individual is powerless to
affect. These examples illustrate the success for rights advocates that can come from
de-ideologizing a group by recasting it in identity terms.
By contrast to the mobility intrinsic to the jurisprudence of expression, the
jurisprudence of equality has grown into a dependence on fixity of identity, a
doctrinal form of immobility. The dichotomizing dynamic itself, by positing
viewpoint and equality as diametrically opposed, reinforces that fixity. The fluidity
of viewpoint helps to constitute, diacritically, by contrast, the fixity of identity. Under
this regime, concepts such as immutability function as containment mechanisms.
Limiting strong equality claims to biologized categories erects borders to their scope
and de-ideologizes the challenge posed by equality.
C. Points of Overlap
The concept of expressive association is the closest the law has come to an
appreciation of speech as a fundamentally social, rather than individual, activity.
Ironically, it suffers from the same historical trajectory as First Amendment liberalism
more generally, in which its celebration of individualism has come to dominate the
doctrine.
79 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
80 See, e.g, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
81 Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
8 2 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THENEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65-121 (1965).
83 As Harry Kalven noted in 1965, "we may come to see the Negro as winning back for us
the freedoms the Communists seem to have lost for us." Id at 6.
84 See Halley, supra note 70.
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Although the significance of the realm of the interpersonal as generative of
expression is central to expressive association, its philosophy flips the two, making
the protection for the social contingent on and derivative of the individual.
Doctrinally, protection for the social production of speech exists as correlative to the
individual's right"5
The doctrine originated in the era of radical leftist movements, and served to
protect individuals from guilt by association by forbidding the state to hold
individuals accountable for the beliefs or actions of groups with which they
associated. 86 The right of the individual to associate with groups without penalty so
long as her own actions were lawful expanded to encompass a right to so associate
without even the knowledge of the state. S7
In later cases, the social nature of the right extended to reach the group itself. The
group acquired a protected interest in expression, including the right to police
membership to maintain its own viewpoint integrity.88 Given its First Amendment
origins, it is no surprise that the substance of the group's right is derivative of the
individual's, the right not to be forced to distort its message.
I find no fault with such a right but note that it is a multiplication of individual
rights bundles, not a socialization of the expression right itself. Despite its potential
to appreciate the social matrix that breeds expression, the doctrine has not expanded
far enough-nor perhaps could it, given its origins-to restructure the underlying
conflict between individualism and a collective claim. It gestures toward a
harmonizing of the two wings ofthe dichotomy, but does not fully engage with them.
The second aspect of First Amendment doctrine that might be thought to offer
a path toward a more nuanced understanding is the doctrine of content or viewpoint
neutrality, itself the realization of an equality principle within expression law. In its
initial explicit appearance, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,89 Justice
Marshall struck down a local ordinance that distinguished between labor picketing
and other picketing, pointedly grounding the holding in the Equal Protection Clause,
rather than the "closely intertwined" First Amendment 90 Proclaiming an "equality
of status in the field of ideas,"91 Marshall framed the right as one not to be
discriminated against for being a person whose views government found
unacceptable.
85 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Patterso, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
86 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
87 Pattersor, 357 U.S. 449; Brown v. Socialist Workers 74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87
(1982).
88 Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
89 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
90 Id at95.
9 1 Id at 96.
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Mosley teetered on the edge between the viewpoint of the speaker and the
identity status of the speaker. The Court's equality result was framed in "who" terms,
i.e., discrimination against a category of persons, but the category was nothing more
than a proxy for viewpoint On the facts of the case, the Court could not have gone
further. Mosley was one of the few cases of its era that arose from a protest not
grounded in a social movement Earl Mosley's lonely picketing of a Chicago high
school seemed to exemplify the actions of an idiosyncratic gadfly. The substance of
his protest, however, was a complaint of race discrimination, and that may partially
explain the inflections of equality that animate the Court's approach.
Had Marshall's efforts at interweaving the doctrines been taken up and
elaborated, it might have led to a richer conceptualization of the interrelationship
between equality and expression than that which inhabits constitutional law today.
But it was not Post-Mosley courts have refined content/viewpoint neutrality into a
powerful mechanism of First Amendment protection, but one that takes no formal
note of the speaker's identity per se. What the content/viewpoint neutrality doctrine
fails to grasp is the potential for the speaker's identity to be central rather than
coincidental.
1!. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
Equality and expression were not always frozen into such starkly divergent
doctrines. During the twenty years between the World War I Era speech cases,
beginning in roughly 1918, and Carolene Products in 193 8, the Court faced a barrage
of cases in which government repression was directed against persons who were part
of political or identity-based minorities or both. At the end of that time, with the
enunciation in Carolene Products' famous footnote four of principles for judicial
protection of personal liberties, the preceding cases were grouped into what have now
become the two established prongs of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause: violation of a fundamental right and discrimination against a suspect class.
Although rightly celebrated as an intervention to protect a richer concept of freedom,
footnote four is not without its downside. By its categorizations, footnote four drove
a wedge into the development of a far more dynamic interplay of conceptions of
liberty and equality.
A. Footnote Four
Rare is the law student who finishes even the first year without leaming of U.S.
law's most famous footnote. In Carolene Products v. United States,92 the Court
announced that it would henceforth defer to legislative judgment on matters of
economic regulation. In so doing, however, it reserved the authority to exercise more
92 United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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searching judicial scrutiny of statutes affecting personal, rather than economic, liberty.
The Court suggested that three categories of laws would be reviewed non-
deferentially. The first was legislation that "appear[ed] on its face" to violate "a
specific prohibition of the Constitution." Second was "legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation." Lastly, the Court singled out "statutes directed at particular
religious, or national, or racial minorities" that were tainted by "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities."
In support of each of these clauses in the footnote, the Court cited a series of
cases. One might suppose that the citations would track the clauses, i.e., that the cases
cited for the "political processes" clause would not implicate "prejudice" concerns
and that the cases cited for the "prejudice against minorities" clause would invoke
doctrines concerning group-based prejudice. The reality is not nearly so simple.
Only two cases cited in the minorities clause rely on equality principles for their
holdings: Nixon v. Herndon93 and Nixon v. Condon94 Those are also the only cases
cited in support of both the equality and the political processes propositions. In
essence, they were one dispute, sequential lawsuits growing out of the refusal of the
Texas Democratic Party to allow African-Americans to vote in primaries.
None of the other four cases cited in support of the "minorities" clause speaks of
"minorities" or "prejudice," nor does any rely on equality for its holding. They
concerned laws regulating private schools-either a total prohibition of such schools
or the prohibition of the teaching of certain languages.95 In each, the Court's
reasoning focused on the self-determination rights of individuals, specifically that of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children and, to a lesser extent that of
teachers of modem languages to practice their profession.96 Two of them-Pierce v.
Society ofSisters and Meyer v. Nebraska--are routinely cited as the beginning point
ofjudicial recognition of a substantive due process right of privacy.97 One would be
93 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
94 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
95 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
967The only hint of equality talk in any of them is in Meyer v. Nebraska: "Ihe protection of
the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those bom with
English on the tongue." 262 U.S. at 401. The holding, however, is based on defining liberty within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause as including the right of the individual to control the
upbringing of his children. Id at 400-01. Justice Holmes dissented:
We all agree, I take it, that it is desirable that all the citizens of the United States should speak
a common tongue.... I am not prepared to say that it is unreasonable to provide that in his early
years [a child] shall hear and speak only English at school.
Id at 412.
97 LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1318-19 (2d ed. 1988):
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hard pressed to find either cited today in support of equality-based protection from
prejudice against minorities.
Thirdly, among the cases cited in support of the 'political processes" clause were
a subset cited as providing examples of legislation interfering with "political
organizations," including Stromberg, Fiske, Whitney, and Justice Holmes's dissent
in Gitlow. What is remarkable here is that these are the very cases decided upon the
most individualistic concepts of liberty. Although they were cited in footnote four as
concerning groups, their holdings had betrayed no hint of that. The holdings in these
cases had not even alluded to the significance of political organizations qua
organizations, nor was the fact that the defendants were targeted because of their
group affiliations seen as a weakness in the state's position. What the holdings had
concerned-the First Amendment-logically should have placed these citations in
the first clause of footnote four, the constitutional text clause. So it is all the more
remarkable that, with one exception (Stromberg was cited in both clauses), they
appeared instead as examples of protection for groups.
The reasons for the seeming mismatch between propositions and authorities may
lie in the turbulent political dynamics of that era, dynamics that had a profound
impact on the law. Footnote four was more than a down payment on the duty to
protect civil liberties, as we tend to read it today. Footnote four marked a moment of
both possibility and reification. In it, equality concepts broader than race gelled for
the first time, as was evident in its reliance on the term "minority," one of the first
times that generic concept appeared in American law.98 And it acknowledged the
connection between group affiliation and suppression of speech, suggesting for the
first time a right of "political organizations." Yet it also provided what would become
the touchstone for an increasingly rigid mechanization of equality analysis.
Both Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society ofSisters, nearly always cited in tandem, have
remained durable and fertile sources of constitutional doctrine concerning the nature of liberty, the
respective rights of social institutions, and the limits of governmental power to homogenize the
beliefs and attitudes of the populace.
Id See also ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, CoNsTrUTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoucEs 654-55
(1997).
Alternatively, they might be read as byproducts of speech rights. Justice Harlan, writing in
1961, opined that "today those decisions would probably have gone by reference to the concepts
of freedom of expression and conscience." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,544 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
98 Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALEL.J. 1287, 1299 (1982).
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B. The New Concept ofEquality
Writing almost a dozen years before Carolene Products, Justice Holmes
described equal protection as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." 99 In
his influential analysis decades later, Gerald Gunther noted that until 1960, few courts
relied on the equality doctrine unless the issue was race.100 How then can the Court's
broader appreciation ofthe dynamics of prejudice in footnote four be reconciled with
its continuing reluctance after Carolene Products to invoke the equal protection
clause when it confronted unfair treatment of other discrete and insular minorities?
Certainly the overwhelming reason for the acknowledgment of prejudice was the
world around them. Hitler's rise to power, the Scottsboro trials, and the execution of
Sacco and Vanzetti all occurred in roughly the decade preceding the Court's decision
in Carolene Products.101 Moreover, the focus of oppositional politics had begun its
shift from ideology to identity. The wave of identity-based politics was beginning to
swell at precisely the moment that the wave of left-based politics was receding.
Central to this shift, especially in the law, was the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Formed in 1909, the NAACP became
the first source of organized and persistent equality claims to come before the
99 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,208 (1927).
100 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a Neiver Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8(1972).
101 The Scottsboro case involved the convictions ofnineAftican-American youths for raping
two white women in Alabama in 1931. The case became infamous because it combined the
elements of an increasingly obvious frame-up and "prejudice against minorities." See generally
DAN CARTER, ScOTrSBORO (1969). The series of trials, convictions, reversals, retrials, repeated
convictions, and appeals lasted six years. In the process, three cases made their way to the Supreme
Court prior to Carolene Products: Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In 1937, the state of Alabama
dropped charges against four of the defendants; the last of the imprisoned defendants was released
in 1950.
Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were Italian-American anarchists who were convicted
of murder and robbery in 1920. See generally ROBERTA STRAUSS FEUERuCHT, JUSTICE CRUCIFIED:
THE STORY OF SACCO AND VANZETrI (1977). This case, too, combined prosecution of ethnic and
political minorities with questionable evidence. After the conviction, there was a prolonged
campaign, first for reversal and then for clemency, involving such notables and friends of the
Justices as Felix Frankfurter (who became a Justice in 1939). Id at 277-408. Justice Brandeis even
allowed Sacco's wife to use his Dedham, Massachusetts home during the trial. Id at 399. The two
were executed in 1927. Id at 409.
It was the rise of Hitler and the realization that racism in the United States was comparable
in its extremism and philosophy to Hitler's anti-Semitism, however, that led to the greatest impact
on public opinion, mobilizing opposition to segregation. PHiLIP A. KLINKNER with ROGERS M.
SMrni, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUAliTY IN AMERICA 137-43
(1999).
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Court.10 2 Its initial foray into the Court occurred within a year after its founding, 0 3
and by 1917 lawyers affiliated with the NAACP had won two major cases.104 By the
time of Carolene Products, the organization had appeared before the Court in at least
ten additional cases.10 5 Even more dramatically, especially to the Court, in 1930 the
NAACP garnered enormous public attention for a lobbying campaign that was a key
factor in defeating a Supreme Court nominee. The NAACP successfully opposed the
nomination of Fourth Circuit Judge John J. Parker for the Supreme Court; on the
basis of his endorsement of grandfather clauses, poll taxes and literacy tests.106 Parker
102 See generally CHARLES FRNT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIAnON FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1967); MN FINCH, THENAACP:
ITS FiGHT FOR JUSTICE (1981); HARvARD SrrKoFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF
CVL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL IssuE: Ti DEPRESSION DECADE (1978).
103 See LOGG, supra note 102, at 57-60 (describing Franklin v. South Carolin 218 U.S.
161 (1910), in which the Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction of a South CarolinaBlack
man).
104 See id at 184-86,205-06 (describingBuchanan v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), in which
the Supreme Court held a Kentucky residential segregation ordinance violated the Due Process
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, and Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), in which
the Supreme Court held Oklahoma's "grandfather clause" violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
105 See FINCH, supra note 102, at 71 (describingNixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), in
which a Texas statute denying a Negro the right to vote in a primary election was found to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), in which it was held that
denying Negroes the right to vote at a primary election violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
those affected could sue for damages); KELLOGG, supra note 102, at 242-45 (describing Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), which reversed the denial of writ of habeas corpus filed by five
Negroes convicted of murder); See also FINCH, supra note 102, at 46 (describing Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), which held the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear
appeal of a suit to enjoin the sale of property to a Negro pursuant to an indenture); Id at 72
(describing Groverv. Townsend 295 U.S. 45 (1936), in which the exclusion ofaNegro from a
primary election under resolution of Texas state Democratic Convention limiting membership in
party to White citizens was held constitutional); SrrKOFF, supra note 102, at 227 (describing
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935), where the Court reversed a rape conviction on the
ground that no African-Americans had ever served on juries in the county where defendant was
prosecuted). The NAACP also brought or participated in Harmon v. Taylor, 273 U.S. 668 (1926)
(arguing successfully that aNew Orleans residential segregation statute was unconstitutional), City
ofRichmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (arguing successfully that a Virginia zoning ordinance
that prevented a person from residing in an area occupied mainly by those with whom
intermarriage is forbidden was unconstitutional), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(holding by the Court that a confession obtained by police through the use of coercion and brutality
is inadmissible).One additional pre-Carolene Products case, Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613
(1938), which involved race-based exclusions from jury service, is included in a list of"NAACP
Legal Defense Cases Before the Supreme Court" that is Appendix B in JACK GREENBERG, RACE
RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 402 (1959).
106 KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J.
PARKER (1990). Organized labor also campaigned against Parker, but according to The Atlanta
Constitution "[t]he number who voted against Judge Parker because organized labor opposed him
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was defeated by avote ofthirty-nine to fourty-one.107 During this period, the NAACP
became the largest equal rights organization in the United States-between World
War I and World War II, the number of its state chapters multiplied ten-fold. 10 8 By
1939, it had 54,000 members.10 9 One historian summarized the decade as follows:
"In the 1930s, the black struggle became professionalized." 110
The Court's official recognition of systemic prejudice was episodic, however,
and hobbled by several political and doctrinal concerns. The problems of race
confronted the Court at each turn. The Court's acceptance of segregation and its
retreat from a Reconstruction Amendment-based project of racial equality no doubt
delayed the possibility of extending any concept of equality, because if it applied only
weakly as to race, it could hardly apply at all beyond that. In that respect footnote
four signaled that the Court had grown uncomfortable with the formal limitation of
equality to race alone.
Yet there was a bigger structural impediment in equality law. The legal discourse
of race rested at that time on the distinction between political and social rights. Such
abominations as Plessy v. Ferguson"l ' turned on the Court's acceptance of the
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal protection only in the
political realm and in courts.112 The states were free to mandate segregation (as
opposed to inequality) because integration marked the point at which equal treatment
became forced association.113 The Court did not seem ready in 1938 to jettison the
political rights/social rights distinction.
perhaps was slightly smaller than the number who voted against him because of the opposition of
Negro leaders." Id at 48-49. Perhaps The Atlanta Constitution was more focused on race than on
labor politics. Nonetheless, the Parker confirmation fight may mark a singular moment in the shift
from labor to identity politics. Writing in 1939, William H. Hastie, who later became a federal
judge, wrote:
That victory and the subsequent defeat of [s]enators who had voted to confirm the Parker
nomination probably impressed the nation more than any other thing accomplished by the
American Negro during the 20th century. For years to come it will remain fresh and persuasive in
the minds of... all aspirants to Federal Office.
Id at 35-36.
1 07 1d at31.
108 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREEROF JIM CROW 124(1974).
109 KLmamE, supra note 101, at 144.
110 SrrKoFF, supra note 102, at 295.
111163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that "separate but equal" transportation facilities did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
112 Id at 544-45.
113 For discussion on the political/social rights distinction, see John P. Frank and Robert F.
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLuM. L. REv. 131
(1950) and Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-EnforcingState Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
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As a result nothing in footnote four disturbed that distinction. Also, the
political/social rights distinction may help explain why the only two cases concerning
race that were cited also supported the political processes clause. By those citations,
the Court implicitly cabined race equality claims to issues such as voting rights. In the
three school cases that were cited, which arguably went beyond political rights, the
Court had not discussed the political/social rights distinction because it had not
discussed equal protection. Thus, nothing in the "prejudice against minorities" clause
of footnote four contradicted the limitations on equality law that had been established
in the race cases. The text of footnote four silently perpetuated the political/social
rights distinction.
However, the logic of the prejudice clause was not limited to political rights. The
rationale was to protect minorities---groups of persons-who were vulnerable to
majoritarian hostility, thereby addressing a failure in the political processes of
lawmaking that could apply equally to all substantive rights. If animus toward certain
minorities was the primary evil, that would call into question a potentially much larger
number of discriminatory laws, both because such laws were not limited to race issues
and because they mandated exclusion as well as inequality, i.e. ventured across the
political/social divide. Footnote four presaged the first crack in the wall of
segregation, which came less than a year later in a ruling that Missouri State
University had to integrate its law school.1 14
If we examine the cases prior to Carolene Products in which the Court had
expressed its discomfort with the hostile treatment of minorities, we see that the focus
was on animus. 115 One large category of such cases consisted of appeals from
criminal convictions, where police brutality, lynch mobs, and racial or ethnic
opprobrium permeated the facts. 16 Justice Holmes, in a letter written just after he had
denied a stay of execution for Sacco and Vanzetti, noted that the world was "stirred
up" about the case. "I cannot but ask myself why this so much greater interest in red
than black. A thousand-fold worse cases of negroes come up from time to time, but
the world does not worry over them."'1 17
Among the "thousand-fold cases" were many involving criminal law. In only
one, Strauder v. West Virginia,18 did the Court rely on equality principles. In
Strauder, the Court established the principle that African-Americans could not be
explicitly excluded by statute from jury rolls, a holding that fell within the political
rights category.119 In other cases, including all three resulting from the Scottsboro
114 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
115 See generally Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 26-
32(1942).
116Id at 26-30.
117 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Lasd, 2 HOuv!s-LAsI LmrrS 974 (M. Howe
ed. 1953) (letter of Aug. 24, 1927).
118 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
119 Id at 310.
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trials, the Court mentioned equality concerns, sometimes in oblique ways, but did not
create precedents for equality law.120
Thus, during most of the pre-Carolene Products period, the Court failed to
develop coherent principles as to the effects of "prejudice against minorities" in the
criminal cases just as it had in the speech cases. Perhaps the most significant
exception to this emerged from a famous reversal. Over a dissent by Justice Holmes,
the Court in 1915 declined to order a new trial in the case of Leo Frank, the defendant
in an openly anti-Semitic prosecution for murder, on the ground that federal courts
lacked the authority to second-guess state court judgments on whether a trial
proceeding was fair.121 The Court radically shifted position in 1923, permitting de
novo federal habeas corpus review of state court verdicts where the facts showed mob
pressure.122 Moore involved a group of African-American sharecroppers in Arkansas
who had been sentenced to death for the murder of a White man during a race riot.
The cases, however, continued to come to the Court.
Another large category of animus-driven cases involved aliens. Some of the
Court's earliest invocations of the Equal Protection Clause had been in alien cases
involving local customs officials who demanded "bond" payments for Asians
entering the country. 123 Had the plaintiffs "been subjects of the Queen of Great
Britain," the Court noted, there would have been quite a different response to the
policy. 124
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance
regulating laundries that was enforced in such a way as to put Chinese-owned
laundries out of business.12 5 The decision can be read as relying on two ideas for
extending racial equality protection beyond African-Americans. In one approach, the
Court stuck to its focus on the extreme "personal and arbitrary power" of the officials'
actions. 126 "[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
120 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (invalidating a coerced confession);
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931) (upholding the rights of a defendant to conduct
voir dire on whether potential jurors were prejudiced in a way that would prevent an impartial
verdict).
121 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,349 (1915). In June, 1915, Governor John M. Slaton
of Georgia commuted Frank's sentence to life imprisonment Two months later, a mob kidnapped
Frank from prison and lynched him. LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE 126, 138-41
(1968). See also Eric M. Freedman, Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of
Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review ofState Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1474-97 (2000).
122 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See generally RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB
InENT oN DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASEs (1988); Freedman, supra note
121, at 1502-30.
123 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S.
259 (1875).
124 ChyLung, 92 U.S. at 279.
125 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886).
126 Id at 370.
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means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be ... the very essence of slavery."'127
The second approach was the Court's first articulation of the generic concept of
group animus as an infection ofjustice. The Court found that the law was applied by
"public authorities... with a mind so unequal and oppressive" as to effectively deny
equal protection of the law. 128 It ruled that even a facially neutral law applied "with
an evil eye and an unequal hand" could violate the Constitution, where only "hostility
to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong[ed]"' 129 could explain the
policy.
In most ofthe alien cases that followed Yick Wo, however, the Court emphasized
the first approach-that of intervention by the Court only where there was extreme
arbitrariness. The resulting doctrine of accepting any rational basis for a classification
led to nonsensical results. The Court upheld laws prohibiting aliens from operating
pool and billiard halls, 130 purchasing land,131 securing jobs on public works
projects' 32 and even obtaining licenses to kill wildlife for sport 33 In each case, the
Court ruled that the classification was "not irrational," and was thus constitutional,
often without stating a reason.134 As Justice Holmes said in Patsone v. Pennsylvania,
"if we might trust popular speech," we can presume aliens to be "the peculiar source
of evil," but it was unnecessary to reach that point because of deference to the state
legislature. 135
Historically, one justification for discriminatory treatment of aliens was the belief
that disloyalty was linked to alienage.136 The conflation ofthis rationale with racism
reached its apex when the Supreme Court upheld "evacuation" orders issued in 1942
that applied to all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether U.S. citizens or not, while
applying to residents of German or Italian ancestry only if those persons had not
127 Id.
128 Id at 373.
129 ld at 373-74.
130 Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
131 See, e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326
(1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
132 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
133 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
134 The one exception to this pattern was Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), in which the
Court invalidated an Arizona law that required all employers of more than five workers to limit
employment of non-citizens to twenty percent of their workforce. The Court found that the law
denied aliens the ordinary means of earning a livelihood because of race or nationality.
135 Patsone, 232 U.S. at 144.
136 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CAL L. REV.
341, 376 (1949).
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become citizens. 137 In effect the law allowed a viewpoint---the presumption of
disloyalty-4o so define the identity of Japanese-Americans as a group that it literally
erased the acts of those persons in acquiring U.S. citizenship. 138
However, in the post-war, civil rights movement era, the balance shifted-
alienage became a suspect classification. 139 Equality became the rule. Linking
alienage to beliefs became the exception, which fully emerged when the Court created
the "political community" rationale for the disqualification of aliens from certain jobs,
such as public school teachers, on the ground that employees in those positions
perform governmental functions such as training citizens and perpetuating national
values. 140 The ambivalent status of equality rights for aliens, which remains today,
embodies the expression-equality dichotomy.
C. Complications ofExpression and Equality
If one impact of footnote four was the broadening of the scope of prejudice
concerns, another was the articulation of discrimination as an independent defect in
laws that fell under the constitutional text and political processes clauses of the
footnote. The footnote suggested, at a minimum, that laws regulating political
organizations, even if not so repressive as to run afoul of the political processes
paragraph, might fall if seriously scrutinized as based on anti-minority prejudice.' 4 '
On this understanding, the "discrete and insular minorities" language might well have
been applied to the political groups that were targets of state persecution in that era.
But on this point, too, the Court danced to the edge of a much broader reading of
equality, and stopped short.
The convergence of the two strands occurred near the height of the Red Scare.
Attorney General Palmer's report on radical propaganda issued in November 1919
included a section on "radicalism and sedition among Negroes" that took aim at the
NAACP's official journal, The Crisis (edited by W.E.B. DuBois), by describing a
journal "always antagonistic to the white race and openly, defiantly assertive of its
137 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
138 "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his
race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire ..... Korematu, 323 U.S.
at 223 (emphasis omitted).
139 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
140 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
141 That concept did generate legislation. Three states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands currently have statutes that prohibit discrimination based on political party or
affiliation. See CAL LAB. CODE §§ 1101-02 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1999); Nnv. REv.
STAT. 281-370 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726 (1999); and 10 V.I. CODE ANN. § 64
(2000).
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own equality and even superiority."142 Two bills were introduced in Congress in
1920 which sought to deny postal privileges to publications appealing to racial
prejudice with the intent to bring about violence, but neither passed. 143 The World
War I Era of attacks on leftist organizations ended without repression of race-based
organizations.
Just one year before Carolene Products, however, the Court received a case in
which race and expression overlapped. In Herndon v. Lowry,144 Georgia prosecuted
an African-American field organizer for the Communist Party under its law
prohibiting incitement to insurrection. By one vote, the Court reversed Herndon's
conviction, ruling that the statute was impermissibly vague in its description of which
acts were prohibited and thus was distinguishable from the statute upheld in
Gitlow.145 The Court also found unconstitutional the punishment of a speaker for the
acts of listeners committed at any later time when it would be reasonable for the
speaker to expect his influence to directly induce those acts. 146
In bringing the case, Georgia "especially relie[d] upon a booklet entitled 'The
Communist Position on the Negro Question,' on the cover of which appears... the
phrase 'Self-Determination for the Black Belt.' 147 The four dissenting members of
the Court found the First Amendment reasoning implausible, assuming that Gitlow
was still good law and stating:
It should not be overlooked that Hemdon was a negro member and
organizer... and was engaged actively in inducing others, chiefly southern negroes, to
become members of the party and participate in effecting its purposes and
program.... Proposing these measures was nothing short of advising a resort to force
and violence, for all know that such measures could not be effected otherwise.148
142 KELLOGG, supra note 102, at 288-89.
14 3 Id at 289.
144 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
145 Id at 256, 268.
146 Id at 261-63.
1471d at 250-51.
To the state, the Communist theory of "self-determination of the Black Belt" was a
particularly incendiary doctrine. While jurors viewed a map showing those areas of the South that
would fall under black political control should the plan be implemented, [the assistant prosecutor]
read lengthy passages explaining the theory, which he regarded as a serious threat to the state of
Georgia.
CHARLEs H. MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JuScE 45-46 (1976).
148 Gitlow, 301 U.S. at 275-76. That was indeed the explicit reasoning of one of the lower
courts in Gitlow. "[N]o sane man could expect" that property owners would
give' up to a proletarian mob without the use of force or violence.... When people combine and
advocate such doctrines, there must necessarily be great latitude for reading between the lines to
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The majority rebuffed suggestions from both conservatives and liberals, and
ignored the impact of the speaker's racial identity and the racial dynamics behind the
case. As a consequence, the holding rendered it a pure speech case and also
completely deraced it. The power of race, however, could not have escaped the
Court's notice, even if it escaped their mention.1 49 Hemdon's lawyer framed the case
in racial terms in his closing argument: "The only charge against Hemdon was his
race, [the lawyer] asserted .... -150
D. Gobitis v. Barnette
After the articulation in footnote four of prejudice concerns as independent of
political process interference concerns, the thin line between state persecution of
racial or ethnic groups and the persecution of voluntarist ideological groups had
grown thinner. How should the law handle cases involving dissenters who were also
targeted as members of a distinct social minority? The options for analysis played
themselves out soon after Carolene Products in a famous pair of cases involving
Jehovah's Witnesses and the flag salute. 151
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld a mandatory flag
salute statute in a decision which virtually pitted opinions invoking the political
interference clause and the prejudice clause against each other. 152 Justice Frankfurter,
for the Court, ruled that such a statute imposed no significant burdens on Jehovah's
Witnesses' rights of free expression and free conscience because they established no
barriers to that group seeking redress through the legislative process. 153 Although
adherents taught their children that the flag salute violated their religious duties,
Frankfurter wrote that a mandatory salute did not prevent the group from continuing
to believe as they wished. 154
determine what is implied ... and they should be held responsible for advocating what they
[know] ... will be essential to the accomplishment of their purpose.
State v. Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. 783, 803 (1921).
149 The record of the case left no doubt as to the racial nature of the prosecution. One state
witness referred to the defendant as a "darkey," which the state supreme court ruled was "not
opprobrious" and thus not in error. Hemdon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 609 (Ga. 1934). A White
witness for the defense was asked, "Do you understand the Communist position [on] equal rights
for negroes to mean the right of a colored boy to marry your daughter, if you have one?" This
question was also found not to be in error. Id at 605.
150 MARTn, supra note 147, at 58.
151 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
152 Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
153 Id at 600.
154 Id
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Justice Stone, author of footnote four, argued in dissent that the mandate violated
both the constitutional text and the prejudice clauses of the footnote. 155 The religious
nature of the organization placed it within the scope of the First Amendment for
protection of its refusal to engage in the salute. Stone did not stop there, however, as
he could have, but referred to that group as a "small and helpless minority," a
"politically helpless minorit[y]"--within the meaning of the prejudice clause. 156
The Court reversed Gobitis three years later, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.157 The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Jackson and
joined by Justice Stone, virtually ignored the prejudice clause. Instead, in broad and
ringing rhetorical strokes, the Court protected the group's refusal to salute the flag
under a freedom of conscience interpretation of the First Amendment. Justice
Jackson, for the court, held that the freedom of conscience was not limited by or to
the religious context of the case.158 Justice Stone, author of footnote four and of the
Gobitis dissent which had stressed the minorities issue, did not write separately. Thus,
the opinion of the Court in Barnette settled on the primacy of expression over
equality/prejudice concerns, with expression framed as an anti-orthodoxy concept
The choice ofthe two possible rationales was presented in the amicus briefs filed
in the case. The American Bar Association's Committee on the Bill of Rights filed
a brief framing the case as about "the impairment of religios liberty. ' 159 Among the
individuals who signed the brief was Zechariah Chafee, Jr., the most influential First
Amendment scholar of the time.160 The American Civil Liberties Union filed an
amicus brief which characterized the case as one "involving minorities" and
specifically cited the prejudice against minorities clause of footnote four.161 In
essence, the Court opted for the analysis of the ABA, rather than the ACLU.
I do not wish to fall into the trap that I criticize, of painting the dichotomy too
starkly or simplistically. Two Justices who did concur in Barnette-Black and
Douglas-wrote to explain their change of heart, both having joined Frankfurter's
opinion for the Court in Gobitis. Their Barnette concurrence rests squarely on
freedom of religion grounds, objecting to a coerced pledge of allegiance both as a
"test oath" and as "a handy implement for disguised religious persecution."1 62 It thus
repeats, although only implicitly and without attribution, the two aspects of Justice
Stone's Gobitis dissent. The equality theme registered more prominently in a
155Id at 601, 606.
156 1d at 604, 606.
157 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
158 Id. at 634-35.
159 Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, as Friends
[of] the Court at 3,25, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591).
160 See Chafee, supra note 10.
161 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, at 16, W. Va., State Bd. of
Edue. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
162 Id at 644.
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precursor to that concurrence, a Jehovah's Witnesses case decided a year earlier in
which Justices Black and Douglasjoined by Justice Murphy, 163 announced their new
position on flag salutes. 164 That opinion referred to "the free exercise of a religion
practiced by a minority group" and the duty of a democratic government "to
accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and
unorthodox." 165
Thus, although the language and theme of "prejudice against minorities" did not
disappear entirely from expression-related cases in the period between Gobitis and
Barnette, Barnette appears to mark the moment when the Court backed off the
possibility of more fully melding the two. Having available the tripartite structure of
footnote four, the Court opted to categorize the flag salute issue within the umbrella
of the first; constitutional-text clause of that footnote. Although it is impossible to
know exactly why this happened, the nature of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the lingering
effects of Progressive-Era liberalism, and Justice Stone's concern for at least the
appearance of judicial insularity may all provide at least a partial explanation.
The Witnesses are an evangelical, millenarian religion based on the Bible, but
sharply critical of all prior Christian faiths, especially the Roman Catholic Church.166
They believe that a limited number of the righteous will reign with Christ in heaven
after Armageddon. Their belief that these persons will be chosen without regard for
nationality, together with their opposition to war in any form, helped land them in
trouble during the red scares of the World War I Era. The group's legal counsel,
Joseph Rutherford, served nine months in federal prison for sedition, a conviction that
was reversed because of the trial judge's apparent bias against Jehovah's
Witnesses. 167 Rutherford's own experience encapsulated the way that free speech
claims by opponents to the war harbored equally strong anti-prejudice concerns.
In 1925, Rutherford, then president of the group, called for a period of aggressive
proselytizing war against Satan, which lasted until Rutherford's death in 1942.168 The
group became known for its aggressive sidewalk and door-to-door preaching and its
sale of literature, as well as its negative campaign (to use current terminology) against
163 Justice Murphy also wrote separately and alone in Barnette, but his concurrence
contained no flavor of the prejudice concern, instead stressing "the right of freedom of thought and
of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution.'Id at 645.
164 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
165 Id at 623-24.
166 Descriptions of the faith's beliefs are drawn from ERic MIcHAEL MAZUR, THE
AMERICANIZATON OF RELIGIOUS MINORrTIES: CONFRONTING THE CONSTTurIONAL ORDER (1999),
and SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOvAH'S WrTNESsEs: RELiGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE
DAvN OFTHERIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000).
167 United States v. Rutherford, 258 F. 855 (2d Cir. 1919); see generally MAzUR, supra note
166, at 31-35.
168 MAzUR, supra note 166, at 36-37.
20001 1705
HeinOnline -- 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1705 2000
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNVAL
other Christians. 169 Local governments used a variety of laws to prevent Witnesses
from proselytizing, including state laws against sedition 170 and ordinances prohibiting
or requiring license fees for certain activities on public streets. 171 From 1933 to 1936,
arrests increased over four hundred percent, from 268 to 1,149.172 In 1935, the group
re-opened its in-house legal office. 173 By 1937, a remarkable number of cases
involving the Jehovah's Witnesses began appearing on the Supreme Court's docket
resulting in twenty-three opinions in the following decade. 174
The data as to arrests and lawsuits understate the enormous animus toward the
group, however. In the early and mid-1 940s, at the height of the patriotic response to
World War II and in the immediate aftermath of the Court's decision upholding a
compulsory flag salute in Gobitis, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Witnesses were
physically attacked, often by mobs. 175 Local police frequently failed to protect them,
and sometimes participated in the attacks. 176 Despite many requests to the Justice
Department there was no federal intervention to counter the vigilantism. 177 The
animus carried over as well into incidents ofjob discrimination and denials of child
custody. 17
8
These attacks were well known. The American Civil Liberties Union filed as an
appendix to its amicus brief in the case a report that it had published documenting
incidents of violence against members of the group. 179 Justice Jackson's original draft
of the Court's opinion in Barnette cited press reports of violence against the
Witnesses. 180 Justice Stone prevailed upon him to remove several "rather too
journalistic" footnotes, however, saying "that he was troubled by the impression that
our judgment of the legal question [in Barnette] was affected by the disorders which
169 For a description of these methods, see Douglas v. City ofJeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 167-
73 (1943).
170 E.g., Taylor v. State, 11 So.2d 663 (Miss. 1943); McKee v. State, 37 N.E.2d 940
(Ind. 1941); Beeler v. Smith, 40 F.Supp. 139 (E.D. Ky. 1941).
171 See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
172 MAZuR, supra note 166, at 41-42.
173 Id at42.
174 PETERS, supra note 166, at 13.
1 7 5 Id at 8-10; ACLU, Jehovah's Witnesses andthe War 9-18 (1943), attached as Appendix
B to ACLU Brief, supra note 161.
176 Peters describes, in graphic detail, one such event in Imperial, Pennsylvania, in 1941.
PETERs, supra note 166, at 1-8.
1771Id at 11.
178 Id
179 See ACLU, Jehovah's Witnesses and the War, supra note 175.
180 PETERS, supra note 166, at 251.
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had followed the Gobitis decision." 181 Jackson complied, and the final opinion
contains a footnote citing only law review commentary critical of Gobitis. 182
In short, the Jehovah's Witnesses were a distinct social group that engendered
prejudice based on their identity as a group, as well as resistance to what they had to
say. Harry Kalven may have been writing tongue-in-cheek when he noted, "it would
not be a bad summary of... three decades of First Amendment issues in the Court
to say simply: Jehovah Witnesses, Communists, Negroes," 83 but he was on to more
than he realized.
The Jehovah's Witnesses cases generated the doctrinal home of the concept of
viewpoint discrimination, the principle under which otherwise legitimate time, place
and manner restrictions fail if they are directed against a particular viewpoint In
developing this body of case law, the Court relied solely on First Amendment
principles, to the exclusion of prejudice clause concerns. As was also true with the
seminal speech cases of the World War I Era, there was no acknowledgment of the
inter-relating dynamics between expression and identity-based claims. Yet in all three
of Kalven's examples, both sets of concerns reinforced and indeed helped to
constitute each other.
IR. DOCRINAL INCOHERENCY: R.A. V
The contemporary Supreme Court faced the equality/expression dichotomy most
directly in RA. V v. City of St. Paul.184 A St Paul ordinance criminalized placing
symbols, objects or graffiti, such as a burning cross or a Nazi swastika, on public or
private property if one knew that such speech would "arouse[] anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."'185 In
R.A. V, a group of adolescents had burned a cross on the front lawn of a home owned
by an African-American family.186 The Court unanimously held the ordinance to be
facially unconstitutional. Although the Court could have grounded its holding solely
on the ordinance's overbreadth, as four Justices urged, 187 it went much further,
apparently drawn by the siren song of the culture wars.
The ordinance was so overbroad that it could not have passed any First
Amendment test The chief argument made in its defense was a limiting construction:
it could be limited to cover only fighting words, a subset of speech categorically
181 Id
182 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,635 n.15 (1943).
18 3 HARRYKALVEN, JR., THENEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 135-36 (1965).
184 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
185 Id at 380.
186 Id at 379.
187 Id. at 413.
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excluded from First Amendment protection. 8 8 The Minnesota Supreme Court had
construed the ordinance to cover only language that would constitute fighting words
or incitement not protected by the First Amendment and to be invalid if applied to
non-fighting words speech. 189 The Minnesota Supreme Court found this instance of
cross-burning constituted fighting words.190 Thus, the state supreme court then
upheld it on the reasoning that if the entire category of fighting words is outside the
shelter ofthe First Amendment then the smaller portion which falls within the ambit
of hate speech must also lack protection.191
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that racist speech could not be singled out
for infringement on the basis of content 192 Even an unprotected category of speech,
the Court wrote, was not "invisible to the Constitution." 193 The Court then defended
the ideational value of hate speech:
It is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de minimis" expressive content or that
their content is in all respects "worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection,"
sometimes they are quite expressive indeed. We have not said that they constitute "no
part of the expression of ideas," but only that they constitute no essential part of any
exposition of ideas. 194
The Court then sharply shifted logical course and analogized fighting words to
a "noisy sound truck: ... 'a mode of speech' ... [that] can be used to convey an
idea." 195 As with a sound truck, the Court reasoned, the government could not
regulate its use based on the content of its message. 196 To do so, the Court held,
penalized speech both on the basis of its content by targeting only those fighting
words that addressed certain disfavored topics, and on the basis of its viewpoint in
that pro-equality speakers could attack anti-equality advocates in harsh terms, but the
reverse would not be permitted.' 97
The case presented a legal question framed in perfect alignment with the
dichotomy. The answer to which side trumped appeared to the Court as self-evident
as the dichotomy itself-thou shalt not tamper with the First Amendment's "preferred
188 E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
189 In re: Welfare ofRA. V, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
190 Id at 510.
191 Id
192 R A. V, 505 U.S. at 385.
193 Id at 383.
19 4 Id at 384-85 (citations omitted).
195 Id. at 386.
196 Id
197 Id. at 391-92.
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position." 198 The petitioner, asserting rights under the First Amendment, argued and
the Court held that restrictions on speech are not a permissible method of fighting
racial hatred. 199 City lawyers defending the ordinance argued that the state's interest
in achieving equality sufficed to justify an infringement on what was valueless
speech. 200
The decision confirmed the worst fears of the egalitarians. Not only did the Court
protect racist speech as viewpoint at the expense of the equality goals of the
ordinance, but it was the racist content of the speech that saved it. Expressions of
hatred not linked to the protected characteristics would have been punishable as
fighting words. As Justice White noted, this aspect of the holding seemed to
announce that expressions of racial hatred "are of sufficient value to outweigh the
social interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words
outside the First Amendment" 201
The logic of a sharp doctrinal border simultaneously led the Court in a
confounding direction under the Equal Protection Clause, however. The Court
explicitly backed off the equal protection basis for Mosley, characterizing the Mosley
holding as an example of the "occasional] fus[ing]" of the two doctrines, "with the
acknowledgment... that the First Amendment underlies its analysis. '202 The Court
stated that while the ordinance could not selectively target speech based on viewpoint,
"a prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or
groups... would be facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause." 20 3 Under that logic, it is at least theoretically possible that a law could
prohibit fighting words directed at persons because of race, but could not prohibit
racist words.
Such a result seems bizarre, but it is consistent with an absolute separation
between speaker and message and with the expression/equality dichotomy. All
messages must be protected equally, but there is constitutional leeway to regulate
groups of speakers based on the objects of their speech. The anomaly becomes more
severe if one ventures beyond characteristics already denominated as suspect under
the Equal Protection Clause. Fighting words directed at groups subject to heightened
scrutiny would be more likely to be disallowed, while epithets based on other
198 The Court first referred to the "preferred place" of the First Amendment in Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). It had earlier described the First Amendment as "the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 327 (1937). That sentiment has become a generally accepted tenet of constittional law.
Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Cow, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422,430-
31(1980).
19 9 RA. V, 505 U.S. at 391.
20 0 Id at 395.
20 1 Id at 402.
20 2 Id at 384 n.4.
203 Id. at 392 (emphasis omitted).
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characteristics, such as physical or mental disability or sexual orientation, would be
less likely to be punishable. The result would be that speech attacking groups who are
least protected under existing law would be allowable, while the groups most
protected from invective would be those already having the most equality protection.
It seems a strange result for a regime dedicated to sheltering dissent.
The confusion between content and identity arose in two other points in the
decision. Justice Stevens accused Justice Scalia of getting the basic distinction
wrong.204 Scalia used the examples of two hypothetical epithets-Catholics [or
"papists"] are scum and "anti-Catholic bigots" are scum-to illustrate viewpoint
bias.205 The first he said, would be prohibited speech under the ordinances because
it would castigate a religious group, hence provoking feelings "on the basis of
religion"; the second would not be prohibited because it would attack an idea.206
Stevens argued that Scalia was setting up the wrong comparison-the proper one,
according to Stevens, was between "Catholics are scum" and "Muslims are scum.' 207
Stevens' point was that all religious identifications were protected equally, and, thus,
there was no viewpoint bias. Although Stevens is correct that "anti-Catholic bigots"
cannot be equated with, for example, "Muslims," he is surely wrong to miss the
ideational content of the identity Catholic (or Muslim, etc.). If identifying yourself as
Catholic stands for something, then the reasoning behind Scalia's comparison, even
if unarticulated, holds up. Neither opinion can do more than make incommensurable
claims, however, because they each hold to the view that the game lies in picking
either identity or viewpoint as the correct benchmark, rather than in seeing them as
holistically merged.
The final instance of the identity/content confusion in RA. V arose in the
exchange between Justices Scalia and White as to sexual harassment law. The two
Justices argued over the application of the holding to hostile-environment sexual
harassment claims. Justice Scalia asserted that such claims would not be barred
because sexual harassment amounts to conduct, not speech. "Sexually derogatory
'fighting words'... [could] produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition
against" discriminatory employment practices.20 8 Thus, reasoned Justice Scalia, the
singling out of sexually derogatory fighting words in that context is permissible
because it falls within the "secondary effects" exception, where the conduct is
penalized for reasons unrelated to the content or viewpoint expressed.20 9
Conversely, Justice White argued that the anti-discrimination law fails the RA. V
test by singling out sexual content rather than by prohibiting all workplace harassment
20 4 Md at 435.
2 05 ld at 391-92.
206 Id.
207 Id at 435.
2 08 Id at 389.
209 Id
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generally.210 Both apparently accept that the target of this aspect of anti-
discrimination law is sexual content, rather than speech harassing women. The
multiple confusions in the Title VII doctrine caused by this conflation have been
analyzed elsewhere.211 In a subsequent opinion, the Court (in another opinion by
Justice Scalia) takes the opportunity to recast hostile-environment law as not targeting
sexual content 2 12 However, the dichotomy-driven pitfall of missing the overlap,
rather than missing the distinction, leads to a carving out of sexual harassment
principles that is implausible and confusing.213
RA. V illustrates other incoherencies structured into the dichotomy. It is the
particularity of the St Paul ordinance that leads to its invalidation, yet the Court
signals that it might permit other forms of particularity, so long as "ideas" were not
regulated. Autonomy rights accrue to the speaker but not to the threatened family.
The collective social good is framed as the interest behind the equality-driven
ordinance, but ultimately justifies the protection of the individual racist In the
process, the racist comes to embody dissent and the African-American family in a
predominantly White neighborhood represents conformity.
Thus, one incoherency is that the dichotomy produces a quick trumping based
on the illusion of a neatly polarized scale of constitutional values rather than a series
of overlapping and interconnected arguments. Another incoherency is the equivalence
of anti-White and anti-Black hate speech. The RA. V result can be seen to exemplify
the claim that seemingly neutral rules operate to reinforce bias, by distorting social
reality and ignoring power imbalances.214 In fact, RA. V illustrates how both sides
in the dichotomized debate seek to tag the other with particularity, either of viewpoint
or of unacknowledged hierarchy: who's orthodoxy, who's exclusion.
While I agree with its critics that neutrality is usually a chimera, I would argue
that the result in RA. V is correct. The St Paul ordinance was absurdly overbroad,
and I do not accept that causing much anger, i.e., "fighting words," should be a
constitutional substitute for the clearly impermissible standard of any anger that the
ordinance contained. But RA. V is not justified because of a simple, easy trumping.
The preferred position of the First Amendment is itselfjustified by many of the same
principles that clearly buttress the social value of the equality of persons.
210 Id. at 409-10.
211 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
2 12 Oneale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
213 See, e.g, Kingsley R. Browne, 7tle VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 O1O ST. LJ. 481 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Sexual Harassment,
Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Barl 1994 S. CT. REV. 1; and
Eugene H. Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791
(1992).
214 See Mar J. Matsuda and Charles R. Lawrence I, Epilogue: Burning Crosses and the
RA. V Case, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRICAL RACE THEORY, AssAULTIvE SPEECH AND THE
FmsT AMENDMENT (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
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Closer to my analysis is that of Steven Shifflin, who faults RA. V within First
Amendment terms, for violating a dissent-centered conception of the First
Amendment 215 Shiffrin argues that the First Amendment itself should be read to
shelter not simply any speaker equally, but especially those speakers "who are out of
power or lower in a hierarchy." 216 On that understanding, a jurisprudence of
expression is defective on its own terms if it is blind to imbalances of power, and if
it fails to recognize that a measure designed to enhance the voice of disadvantaged
dissenters has "a special claim to be heard under a dissent model of free speech."217
Shiffrin's argument captures the link between inequality and dissent but its
analytic power remains limited to an individualized model of expression. Shiffrin
contextualizes the dichotomy by factoring in the social position of each speaker, but
cannot reconcile it "[W]e should not blink the tension between these amendments,"
he concludes.218
There is an even more fundamental flaw, however, in distinguishing free speech
and equal protection claims in the way that the Court does in R.A. V. The effect of and
intention behind racist invective and invective directed at racial groups is the same.
The fault line in the expression/equality dichotomy is the proposition that one can
fully separate the two principles in the first place.
IV. THE MATRIX OF MULTICULTURALISM
On this set of issues, it is easy to hear the echoes of legal doctrine in broader
political and cultural discourse. Beyond the realm of such doctrine, the debate over
hate speech and other aspects of the expression-equality dichotomy have been
conceptualized as involving the conflict between difference and dissent models
which emerged from competing sets of assumptions and values.
The politics of difference developed in part from a critique of the false neutrality
of such principles as 'ree speech," the core concept of dissent Difference or identity
politics seeks to reveal the unequal power that classical liberal theory often masks. It
seeks to situate the self in a matrix in which the meanings of any given practice vary
depending upon the point from which one views them. It also attempts to inscribe a
richer concept of self, one that develops in the context of interaction with others.
215 Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Meaning of America, in IDENrrIEs,
PoLmCS, AND RiGHTS 307 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1995). See also Steven H.
Shifffin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning ofAmerica, 80 CoRNELL L.
REv. 43 (1994); STEvEN H. SHIFjN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 91
(1990) ('To promote dissent is ordinarily not to promote anomie individualism; to promote dissent
is to promote engaged association.").
2 16 Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Meaning ofAmerica, supra note 215, at 343.
2 17 Id. at 344.
218 Id.
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By contrast, the law and politics of dissent reinforce the central assumptions of
traditional liberalism-a validation of individualism and an emphasis on voluntary
choices and concomitant responsibilities. The idea of dissent necessitates a sharp
boundary between self and others. However, it is a neutral border; the preservation
of "the autonomy of the speaker" is a, perhaps the, central value.219
While individualist speakers may be sacrosanct, they are also fungible. First
Amendment law concerning dissent is founded on the principle that any speaker
potentially can express any opinion, and that no individual's right to speak should be
contingent on any aspect of her identity. Individual, voluntary choices form the core
of protected expressive activity.
The clash of equality and expression has manifested itself repeatedly in recent
years, often in a cluster of issues grouped loosely as "multiculturalism. ' 220
Proponents of multiculturalism have advocated an opening up of institutions such as
the academy to new voices, most prominently voices of people of color and of
women, associated with identity group politics. Multiculturalists assert that the old
canonic assumptions and texts embodied a distinct, if invisible, racial and gender bias,
and that only by reaching out to and bringing in these new, identity-inflected voices
could such institutions be legitimate in a democratic culture.
Opponents of multiculturalism have often resisted this identity campaign with
defenses of individualism. They perceived a threat that multiculturalism would
suffocate robust and candid debate by a selective protectiveness toward these voices,
justified because these voices were newly legitimized and thus politically fragile.
Confrontations arose over the position of the state vis-a-vis the shielding of speech
that was, alternatively, defensive of the status quo, bigoted or even hateful. In legal
discourse, the issue of regulating hate speech has provided a prime context for the
elaboration of the tension between expression and equality. This article will not
recapitulate that debate, already extensively explicated and analyzed.221 The first
219 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civil
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267
(1991).
220 There is an enormous literature, pro and con, on multiculturalism. Sympathetic accounts
and overviews include Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Responding to the Demands of
Difference: An Introduction, in CULTURAL PLURAIsM, IDENTITY PoLITICS AND THE LAW 1-25
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999); lIRs MARiON YOUNG, JUsTIcE AND THE POLmcs
OF DFFEuRECE (1990); and MULTiCULTJRALSM: ExAmiNNG THE POLmcs OF RECOGNITON (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1994). Criticisms include TODD GITuN, THE TWIuGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY
AmmCA IS WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995); NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL
MULTICULTURAUSTs NOw (1997); ARTHMUM. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DiSUNrmNG OF AMERICA
(1992); and J. Harvie Willdnson 111, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in
MulticulturalAmerica 47 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1995).
221 A modest sampling of the law review literature would include: Richard Delgado, Words
That Wound: A Tort Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
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relevant point here is that what both sides in this ongoing debate agree on, virtually
without challenge, is the stability of the dichotomy itself.222
The second relevant point is that, on that question at least, they are both wrong.
The debate is not as simply dichotomized as it seems. The disputes about hate speech
and, more generally, multiculturalism actually illustrate the slippages and
incoherencies in the dichotomy. The too easy polarization misses the extent to which
the difference and dissent values co-exist and compete within each wing of the
multiculturalism debate.
Both sides use the expression/equality dichotomy as shorthand for disputes on
a series of component issues. Those component issues give the equality-expression
binary its political punch. In fact, however, these component issues exist quite
independently of their framing as expression or dissent versus equality or difference.
They are most profitably analyzed as they exist within each of the doctrinal poles of
debate. Three such component questions are central to the legal discourse, and they
recur throughout analysis of the dichotomy and any exploration of alternative
concepts.
A. Socially Constructed Selves
A central tension underlying the equality-expression face-off in the
multiculturalism debates is whether individual autonomy should continue to function
RUTGERs L. REy. 287 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Case of
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 Soc. PHIL, & POL'Y 1991; Charles R. Lawrence M, fHe
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Toni M.
Massaro, Equality and Freedom ofExpression: The Hate Speech Dilemma 32 WM. & MARYL.
REV. 211 (1991); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARYL. REV. 267 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]; Rodney A.
Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. &
LEaL. REv. 171 (1990); and Nadine R. Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DuKEL.J. 484.
222 "At the center of the [hate speech] controversy is a tension between the constitutional
values of free speech and equality." Lawrence, supra note 221, at 434. See also Calvin R. Massey,
Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity and the Foundational Paradigms ofFree Expression, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 103, 104-05 (1992) ("Maintaining simultaneous fidelity to both of those principles [free
expression and the equal dignity of persons] has never been easy, but it has become vastly more
difficult" as the controversy over hate speech has grown.); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 221,
at 271 ("[W]riting this essay has been difficult and painful. I am committed both to principles of
freedom of expression and to the fight against racism. The topic under consideration has forced
me to set one aspiration against the other .... "); Redish & Lippman, supra note 219.
One who has questioned the inevitability of the dichotomy is John A. Powell. John A. Powell,
As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful Speech in a Democratic Society, 16
LAW & INEQ. 97 (1998); John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and
Equality, 85 Ky. L.J. 9 (1997).
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as the lodestar for deploying the rule-setting power of law. Traditional liberals have
denounced the risk to freedom posed by legal principles that give greater weight to
group claims than to those of individuals. This argument is often conducted in terms
of the traditional liberal defense of expression that seeks to devalue certain groups,
such as hate speech, versus the multiculturalist willingness to silence that speech to
better protect the group. The alignment of individual autonomy with expressive
interests and group rights with equality interests is both misleading and superficial,
however.
It is misleading because it fails to acknowledge the extent to which both sides in
the debate invoke each other's arguments. From Brandeis through Alexander
Meildejohn to the present, one major justification for the primacy of the expression
right has been the collective interest in fostering the kind of self-actualization that
produces good citizens. Individual autonomy is necessary, in this argument, for the
integrity of group self-govemance. Equality advocates, on the other hand, invoke not
only group claims and rights, but also argue individual self-actualization as a
justification for group-based equality. Underlying much of the multicultural rhetoric
is a reliance on the integrity of personhood, a self that is not deformed by stigma and
subordination. Depending on one's perspective, either the privileging of
individualism collapses back into the concept of social needs, or the invocation of
inclusion and full participation collapses back into individualism.
Egalitarians attack liberals for a double standard: for celebrating individualism
but, contradictory to their own First Amendment philosophy, undermining the
collective space which is its goal when the issue is the harmful effects of bias on the
scope of public culture.
Liberals, on the other hand, respond that privileging the power of any unit larger
than the individual invariably either risks subordinating the interests of those most
marginal groups who cannot even muster equality claims that society recognizes as
plausible or merely declares by flat which previously less powerful groups shall now
be deferred to, producing a new hierarchy that is doomed to repeat the problems of
the current one.
Neither perpetuating nor renouncing the trope of individualism will untie this
knot, however, because the nub ofthe dispute lies at a deeper level. I have argued that
our most cherished doctrinal charter of individual liberty in fact grew from group
action intended to assert a claim of what was undeniably group rights. At a deeper
level, the debate elicits questions about the extent to which individual autonomy is
more than a myth. Neither the accepted understanding that expression is a
communally-shared value nor the claim that speech is always and intrinsically a social
product cuts as deeply into traditional liberal assumptions as the argument that the self
is a socially-generated function.
This claim raises the stakes for how the law values autonomy vis-a-vis
participation because it strikes at the heart of the premises built on a foundational
primacy of the individual. We assume that democracy is shaped by the cumulative
wills of free agents, and that protection of individual self-determination is a necessary
17152000]
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precondition for collective self-determination. The postmodem notion that flips this
assumption on its head and asserts that the self is largely created by culture threatens
to upend any liberal conception of rights.
Indeed, absolutist denial of selfhood cannot be reconciled with the concept of
persons as rights holders upon which our law depends. A more modulated critique,
however, that seeks to recalibrate the balance between individual autonomy and social
goods, animates much of the multiculturalism debates.
The work of Robert Post exemplifies the challenge posed to traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence by culture-centered, rather than individual-centered,
analysis. Post's analysis does not lead him to take sides in the hate speech debates;
instead he calls for a contextualized analysis of particular situations.223 However, he
sees First Amendment functions in profoundly social terms, with "self-determination
requir[ing] the antecedent formation of a 'self' through socialization into the
particularity of a given community life."224 In his view, First Amendment protections
should focus explicitly on the value of the social practices that give acts of expression
their meaning and that are made possible by speech. "Doctrine ought to identify
discrete forms of social order that are imbued with constitutional value, and it ought
to clarify and safeguard the ways in which speech facilitates that constitutional
value."2 2
5
Thus, although he is ambivalent about hate speech, Post has criticized the Court's
ruling in Hustler Magazine v. Falwel1226 for barring enforcement of common law
torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the rationale of preserving
free expression.2 27 Repression of speech which is assaultive of the integrity of one's
personality, in his view, serves the important function of facilitating the kind of public
civility necessary for rational deliberation. Characterizing those civility rules as the
glue of community life and community life as the source of individual personality,
Post argued that laws protecting that social, interactive process merited
enforcement.2 28 As his call for "reconciling individual and collective autonomy
through the medium of public discourse" 229 demonstrates, an argument for
recalibration of the balance does not answer the question of which side in the
multiculturalism debates wins. But it does better reveal the depth and true
223 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 221, at 325-27.
224 Id at 326.
225 Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1276-
77 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating].
226 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
227 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept ofPublic Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601, 616-26
(1990).
228 Id at 616-18, 633-38.
229 Post, Recuperating, supra note 225, at 1275.
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configuration of one of its tensions than does the framing of individual versus group
rights.
B. Assimilation and Particularity
The second component issue submerged in the dichotomy is the social value of
assimilation into a single, hybrid, American culture versus that of celebrating
difference and particularity. Assimilation versus difference became a master metaphor
for the debate and for the historical moment of the "culture wars." Most provocatively
stated, the universalist view is that "we are just one race here. It is American. 23 °
Gary Peller has posited that the history of integration in the 1950s and 1960s
fueled a liberal, universalist understanding of race.231 During that period,
integrationism became the political project of dominant social elites. Under that world
view, neutrality and color blindness were associated with rationality and truth. The
belief that race should make a difference in social relations was associated with
particularity or race consciousness, as expressed both by white segregationists and
black nationalists. Peller argues that one price paid for ending American apartheid
was the rejection of both manifestations of particularity as equally wrongheaded,
albeit headed in opposite directions.232 A deviation in any direction from a universal
norm of objectivity signaled racism.
The privileging of integration fits comfortably into the traditional logic of First
Amendment debates, assuming that all disputants in an ideological contest share a
common framework of references that amounts to a common cultural vocabulary.
Otherwise, the absence of that lingua franca leads to what Robert Bork called "a
chaos of cultures," 233 with each group "urged to become or remain a separate
tribe."234 In this way, the liberal individualism that undergirds the First Amendment
perspective is linked to assimilation in a parallel framework.
Multiculturalists insist that preserving and valuing different norms and standards
is essential for full democracy. They reject what postmodemists term the
"normalizing discourse" of universalist themes and majoritarian understandings in
favor of preserving cultural zones of resistance anchored in counter hegemonic
communities-of color, of gender, of language, of sexuality.
However, the assimilation versus difference dynamic does not upon closer
inspection, align well with the expression-equality dichotomy. Assimilation and
universality are linked with First Amendment liberalism in the multiculturalism
debates, but the First Amendment's privileging of anti-conventional dissent can be
230 Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
231 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
232 Id
233 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMMECAN DECLINE 298 (1996).
234 Id at 299.
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equally well linked to the impulse toward separatism. This is most evident in a
number of the Religion Clause cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder,235 where the Amish
were allowed to remove their high-school age children from public schools in order
to sustain their insular faith community.
Consider the anti-essentialist critique of identity politics. It argues that equality
claims founded on the assumption that woman, for example, is an unproblematic,
unitary subject inevitably reinscribes racist and other power structures because the
woman posited as the norm is invariably White.236 This critique leads to increasingly
specific claims of identity differentiated from any concept of the norm, of, for
example, "the" African-American woman. "The source of gender and racial
essentialism (and all other essentialisms, for the list of categories could be infinitely
multiplied) is the second voice, the voice that claims to speak for all."2 37
Critical theorists have framed the anti-essentialist critique, as based on equality,
as an argument for a fundamental rethinking of the norms from which identity claims
take radical exception. The same critique, however, could as easily be framed as one
of dissent from "the second voice." The recognition that anti-essentialists seek is not
merely one of presence but at least as importantly, of a distinctive point-of-viewing.
Additionally, the dichotomy misstates the extent to which the egalitarians attack
particularity. A central part of their critique is that neutrality masks the issue of
dominance and power. First Amendment civil libertarians contend, in varying
degrees, that state power must and, more fundamentally, can be neutral. Most analysis
of multiculturalism turned on its demand for more voices to be heard and, more
problematic, for new voices to replace old ones in situations of scarcity (e.g., the
reading list for freshman English). Liberals would argue that replacing White with
African-American authors is reverse racism, or perhaps not even reverse.
Multiculturalists would argue that it is not racism at all.
But multiculturalists also attacked the perceived norm or universal as itself
particularized-as raced or gendered, for example-and thus not neutral but biased.
As Martha Minow stated it "impartiality is the guise that partiality takes to seal bias
against exposure. '238 The logic of that argument is that particularization is harmful
when misperceived as universal and aggravated by imbalances of power. In effect,
multiculturalists made a qualified argument that racial or gender specificity is a
problem, albeit not the primary one.
The central paradox of the universal versus particularist subdivision of the
multiculturalism debates is the mutual dependency of the two antagonistic
235 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
236 Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
237 Id at 588.
2 3 8 MARTHAMINOW, MAKING ALLTE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLusIoNANDAMRIcAN
LAw 376 (1990).
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positions. 39 Individual rights claims deployed along various doctrinal paths depend
on the classificatory power of the modem liberal state, a power which generates
regulatory identities. And identity formations depend on the universalist ideal, the
"second voice," for their very existence as recognizable difference.
C. Orthodoxy and Exclusion
Finally, the dichotomy misses the synergistic quality of its two seemingly
opposed political projects. The prime aspiration of the liberal individualists is to
achieve state neutrality as to viewpoint, a pluralism that fosters all points of view
equally and uncritically. It is a world view in which the worst evil is orthodoxy and
its prevention is the great "fixed star" of American constitutionalism.240
For the egalitarians, the project is largely remedial, an attempt in the spirit of the
Reconstruction Amendments to repair entrenched inequalities by recalibrating what
constitutes neutrality. In that project, curbing some expression is a legitimate means
ofmaking space for other speakers, of countering subordination. For multiculturalists,
the great evil is exclusion.
Orthodoxy and exclusion are not, and need not be, trade-offs, however.
Orthodoxy and exclusion feed off and breed each other. One ofthe most quoted First
Amendment aphorisms used to rebut hate speech, for example, is that "the best
answer to bad speech is more speech."1241 To a large extent, however,
multiculturalism is "more speech." The free speech arguments that are mustered in
opposition signal that the political valence of the First Amendment has drifted from
that of a progressive intervention against institutions of dominance into often a
defense of such institutions. The politics of identity and equality represent a kind of
insubordination against what the cultural meaning of free speech has become.
By taking the bait of the First Amendment's trope of individualism,
multiculturalists lose the power and bite of dissent The problem with identity politics
is not its fragmentation of an illusory neutrality and American-ness. It is how to
liberate identity politics from itself-from its own tendencies to dead-end in a
seemingly endless specification process producing ever more particular identity
claims. Recognizing identity and dissent as mutually constitutive may help.
In sum, the multiculturalism debate comprises a series of component debates
over the viability of previously accepted premises for liberal democracy-a modernist
claim to selfhood, the master metaphor of assimilation, and the ideal of a neutral state.
These constitute a dispute that is real but far less neat than both sides describe.
239 Wendy Brown, WoundedAttachments: Late Modem Oppositional Political Formations,
in ThE IDENTiTY IN QuESriON 205 (John Rajchman ed., 1995).
240 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
241 The aphorism is based on Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357,377 (1927).
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V. TOWARD ANTI-ORTHoDOxY AND INCLUSION
Not only are expression and equality too mutually embedded to be disaggregated
in a way that makes cultural sense, but they represent two ways of addressing the
same evil of oppressive discursive regimes. Censorship and exclusion perform the
same ultimate function: truncation of the richness of the public sphere. One should
not be more or less vulnerable to challenge than the other.
A. Multiple Meanings
For some groups and identities, the amount of animus and stigma directed toward
them is such that they suffer widespread discrimination. Recognizing them is not
difficult The patterns of discrimination are reflective of deeper patterns of social
stratification. Often such patterns have led to protective measures from courts or
legislatures or both.
Equality-based interventions occur when those groups or identities seek inclusion
or equal treatment and are resisted. Their efforts to attain inclusion or equality is
intrinsically a move against orthodoxy because they challenge the patterns of
stratification and the ideology of dominance that undergirds those patterns.
When equality law is conceptualized as protection against idiosyncratic prejudice
rather than against ideologies of dominance, it is weakened at the core. Prejudice
operates as "a lens that distorts reality"242 and causes misperceptions ofthe worth and
ability of individuals with certain characteristics. Ideologies of dominance, on the
other hand, are neither arbitrary nor irrational, but rather are integral parts of systems
of power. Those systems may also be blind to individual worth, but the interests that
some persons and groups have in maintaining lines of stratification are quite rational.
A de-ideologized concept of equality works doctrinally because of the dichotomy
between expression and equality. Once law categorizes systems of dominance as
ideological, they can acquire First Amendment protection, at least in the private
sector. Once law categorizes claims for inclusion or equality as ideological, they may
lose shelter under the Equal Protection Clause.243
Seeking to resolve this problem in an overall scheme of both inclusion and anti-
orthodoxy does not mean that anti-equality voices lose their First Amendment
protection. If nothing else, such voices do function as dissidents from a legal mandate
if nothing else, even if the equality law is a minority or counter-majoritarian view in
the culture at large.
242 ELY, supra note 77, at 153.
243 For a more extensive argument as to the ramifications of this paradox throughout
constitutional law, see Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality,
35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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But an equality mandate is not "the new orthodoxy."244 The concept of anti-
racism, for example, may acquire some measure of the power of the state in its
support in the form of a civil rights law, and racists have every right to dissent from
that concept and to seek the instantiation of openly racist policies. As a result, they
may be situational dissenters, opposing the heavier hand of the state, but their views
are not anti-orthodoxy in any sense that incorporates the history and dynamics of race
in the United States. We need not blind ourselves to a social reality that continues to
reverberate throughout every aspect of American life in order to respect a right to
situational dissent
Enforcement of equality law does need to be sufficiently narrowly tailored to
preserve the rights of those who resist it on ideological grounds. Equality resisters
should not simply be steamrolled out of any capacity to express their resistance. But,
when one assesses the interests of the state in enforcing equality, one should include
anti-orthodoxy in the balance on the side of equality, not on the side of subordination.
That is the profound difference that civil rights laws have made to the concept of anti-
orthodoxy.
B. Harassment Law
Applying that approach offers a way to explain why most sexual harassment law
is consistent with RA. V, without relying on the outmoded notion of fighting words
or incidental restrictions, as Justice Scalia did in RA. V.245
Hostile environment harassment may consist solely of speech. The prohibition
of harassing speech is not limited to face-to-face situations; it is judged by "the totality
of the circumstance" and "context."246 What justifies repressing that speech is its
function as a targeted method of exclusion and subordination.2 47 The fact that it also
244 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(quotes used for emphasis).
245 See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text. Scalia's analysis ran as follows:
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
conduct (a law against Ireason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example,
sexually derogatory "fighting words," among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices. Where the government
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,389-90 (1992) (citations omitted).
246 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999).
247 JAM. Balkin, Free Speech andHostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,2307-08
(1999). See also Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workllace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the
First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 ViL. L. REV. 757 (1992).
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expresses a viewpoint does not inoculate it from coverage under equality law. This
rationale engages more forthrightly with the purposes of sexual harassment law than
other justificatory grounds that have been proposed. The fact that workers are a
captive audience and the assertion that speech in the workplace is subject to greater
regulation than speech on the street may be related to the capacity of harassing speech
to enforce exclusion.248 However, those rationales avoid, perhaps intentionally so, the
most difficult aspects ofthe conflict in rights between women workers and harassers
by negating the viewpoint-rich content of much harassing speech.
I would acknowledge that harassers are often expressing a viewpoint and require
that civil rights protections be narrowly tailored to enforce equality without
gratuitously trampling speech.249 In my view, the current test for sanctioning
harassment largely achieves that goal. The Court has held that Title VII is violated
"when the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.'. 250 This standard draws
the line based on how harassing speech operates in the particular circumstances at
issue, not based on generic harm, fighting words, obscenity, or other categories of
speech that lie outside the shelter of the First Amendment
Some proposals to cut back on sexual harassment law would limit it to cover only
face-to-face harassment 251 That approach has the advantage of drawing a bright line,
but the disadvantage of missing many of the practices that are most exclusionary, and
suggesting a far too easy gambit for restricting equality by making the harassment
anonymous.
Another proposal by Cynthia Estlund argues that a new subcategory of verbal
workplace harassment should be carved out from First Amendment protection.252
Estlund argues that the totality of the characteristics of the workplace mark it as "a
satellite domain of public discourse," justifying its own status as an exception. 253
Although Estlund's approach has the appeal of leapfrogging over attempts to ground
24 8 Balkin, supra note 247, at 2311-14. See also Fallon, supra note 213, at 18-19; Aguilar
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 869-73 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring)
(holding an injunction preventing an employer from using any derogatory racial or ethnic epithets
is not a prior restraint of speech), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 2029 (2000).
24 9 See Strossen, supra note 247, at 763, 777; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-
77(1968).
2 50 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Say. Banks, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986) (citations omitted)). As Richard Fallon notes, the Court's
decision in Harris never mentions the First Amendment. Fallon, supra note 198, at 1.
25 1 See generally Volokh, supra note 213; Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Worqlace,
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990).
252 Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. Rnv. 687 (1997).
253 Id at 718-41.
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harassment law in the multiple other First Amendment exceptions, I am disinclined
to generate even more categories of unprotected speech.
I do not intend, however, that all speech that may be experienced as offensive to
women should be prohibited as harassment The sexualized nature of speech, as
distinct from its genuine exclusionary power, may influence some courts to range too
broadly into problematic but protected expression.2 54 Generic hate speech-
pornography which is misogynist-or off-color, tasteless remarks may be too indirect
ambiguous or dismissible to operate as effective methods of exclusion. The
expressive viewpoint functions of such speech may outweigh their power to damage
the working conditions of those seeking inclusion. For the state to suppress speech
in those circumstances strays too far beyond the bounds of narrowly tailored
enforcement mechanisms.
The rationale that I endorse preserves the rights of speakers without having to
invest the anti-equality advocates with the undeserved mantle of victims of a "new
orthodoxy." Like the African-American family in R.A. V, it is women seeking to
integrate enclaves of masculinist supremacy who are the forces of genuine anti-
orthodoxy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The "preferred position" of the First Amendment in our Constitutional hierarchy
is not innocent or foreordained. It is a product of a particular history, that of social
movements in the first half of the twentieth century, which itself has been shaped and
reshaped by the ideology of individualism. Resistance to recognizing the social nature
of expression has fostered a hyper-individualist philosophy of speech.
Similarly, resistance to recognizing animus systematized along lines of social
stratification rather than personal bias has limited equal protection analysis. The focus
on irrational prejudice made the immutability concept appealing-to penalize persons
for that over which they had no control was nonsensical as well as unfair. Equal
protection concepts became centered on groups with frozen lines of definition.
Together these dynamics exaggerated the distinctions between expression and
equality.
When one rejects the platitudes and interrogates the expression-equality
dichotomy, however, multiple complexities arise. The dichotomy begins to seem
increasingly artificial-an unworkable paradigm grafted onto a complicated mix of
political dynamics that do not fall into the neat boxes it prescribes.
My goal in this article has been to open a space for the emergence of counter-
meanings. If we re-situate discourses of knowledge and examine the reasons behind
the reification of both expression and equality, we can uncover the systems of power
that they perpetuate. Dichotomy is not the only available model. We can instead
254 See Schultz, supra note 211, at 1689.
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construct one that reflects the complexity and fluidity of these centrally important
principles.
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